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ADMINISTERING THE TAX SYSTEM WE HAVE
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN†
ABSTRACT
Traditional perceptions of tax exceptionalism from administrativelaw doctrines and requirements have been predicated at least in part
on the importance of the tax code’s revenue-raising function. Yet,
Congress increasingly relies on the Internal Revenue Service to
administer government programs that have little to do with raising
revenue and much more to do with distributing government benefits
to the economically disadvantaged, subsidizing approved activities,
and regulating outright certain economic sectors like nonprofits,
pensions, and health care. As the attentions of the Treasury
Department and Internal Revenue Service shift away from raising
revenue and toward these other matters, the revenue-based
justification for tax exceptionalism from general administrative-law
norms fades. To demonstrate the shift, the Article incorporates
empirical analysis of Treasury Department and Internal Revenue
Service regulatory activity over time.
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INTRODUCTION
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
1
States, the Supreme Court rejected tax exceptionalism from
2
administrative-law requirements and doctrines absent justification.
Yet, many tax-administrative practices do not comport precisely with
general administrative-law norms.
Some differences are most likely due to a combination of
specialization, cloistering, path dependence, and litigation strategy, as
attorneys have failed to recognize or declined to mention tax
departures from general administrative-law norms and generalist
3
judges have relied on attorneys’ briefs. For example, tax lawyers and
administrators have a longstanding habit of labeling general authority
regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) as
“interpretative rules,” even though such regulations are legally
1. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
2. See id. at 713 (“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review
good for tax law only.”).
3. See Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate
Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 92 (2011) (identifying litigation strategy as a partial
explanation for tax departures from general administrative-law norms); see also Paul Caron, Tax
Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517,
531–89 (1994) (highlighting several areas, including tax administration, in which a “tax is
different” mindset has yielded tax exceptionalism in the law). See generally Robert Glicksman &
Richard Levy, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011) (describing how
specialization, cloistering, and path dependence lead to judicial divergence from administrativelaw norms, with tax as one example).
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binding and thus “legislative” in general administrative-law parlance.
As a result, for many years prior to Mayo, generalist courts and tax
litigants talked past each other, and briefs in tax cases regularly failed
to alert courts to the disagreement over whether the tax-specific
5
6
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States standard of review
survived the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
7
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., leading to a jurisprudential
8
mess. The same habit of terminology has caused Treasury to claim
routinely that most of its regulations are not subject to notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure
9
Act (APA), even as the regulations bind taxpayers and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) alike—a circumstance that is currently
10
causing jurisprudential mischief.
Other tax deviations from general administrative-law norms are
the result of congressional choice. For example, administrative-law
doctrine interprets the APA as requiring a presumption in favor of
11
judicial review for legal challenges against final agency actions. In
the tax context, Congress has deliberately limited judicial review with
12
the Anti-Injunction Act, Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 7421,
although the full scope of that limitation is unclear. Retroactive
13
rulemaking typically is not an option for other agencies. By

4. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 520 (observing the habit). See generally Kristin
E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007)
(examining the incidence and legal validity of characterizing Treasury regulations as exempt
from APA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements).
5. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
6. Id. at 477.
7. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondent at 16–
19, Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (No. 09837), 2010 WL 3934618, at *16–19; see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 516–26
(connecting the legislative and interpretative terminology discrepancy with pre-Mayo judicial
confusion over whether Treasury regulations were Chevron eligible); Kristin E. Hickman, The
Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537,
1556–59, 1563–89 (2006) (documenting the origins of the pre-Mayo judicial confusion at greater
length).
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012).
10. See generally Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3 (observing this condition); Hickman,
supra note 4 (documenting this position empirically).
11. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
12. Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421 (2012).
13. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (rejecting retroactive
rulemaking by agencies absent express congressional authorization).
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comparison, Congress has explicitly given Treasury broad authority
14
to adopt retroactively applicable regulations in I.R.C. § 7805(b).
Further, in response to claims that Treasury’s use of temporary
regulations violates APA notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements, the government has argued that I.R.C. § 7805(e)
15
expressly authorizes it to do so.
Whatever the origins of the differences between taxadministrative practices and general administrative-law norms, courts
and scholars often invoke the importance of revenue raising to
explain or defend tax exceptionalism. Long before Mayo, in Bull v.
16
United States, the Supreme Court justified special limitations on a
taxpayer’s ability to challenge tax assessments and collections on the
ground that “taxes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt
17
and certain availability an imperious need.” Professor Steve Johnson
has identified the “revenue imperative” as the claimed justification
for “several features of tax administration that uniquely advantage”
the IRS, including the Anti-Injunction Act limitation on judicial
18
review of Treasury and IRS actions. Writing for the Court in Bob
19
Jones University v. Simon, Justice Powell similarly concluded that
“the principal purpose” of the Anti-Injunction Act is “the protection
of the Government’s need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously
as possible with a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial
20
interference.” Citing several cases, Nina Olson, the National
Taxpayer Advocate, has linked the revenue-raising function to
judicial reluctance to impose common procedural due process
21
requirements upon IRS revenue-collection efforts. Some tax
14. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012).
15. See Brief for the United States at 29, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,
132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139), 2011 WL 5591822, at *29 (citing I.R.C. § 7805(e) as
“granting the Treasury Department authority to issue temporary regulations”); Brief for the
Appellant at 51–52, Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. United States, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1204), 2010 WL 6210551, at *51–52 (“If the absence of notice and comment
could deprive temporary regulations of validity, then § 7805(e) is meaningless.”).
16. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
17. Id. at 259–60.
18. Steve Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX
REV. 269, 279–80 (2012); see also Nina E. Olson, Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2010 Erwin N.
Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel: Taking the Bull by Its Horns:
Some Thoughts on Constitutional Due Process in Tax Collection (Jan. 23, 2010), in 63 TAX
LAW. 227, 232 (2010) (making a similar connection regarding the Anti-Injunction Act).
19. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
20. Id. at 736.
21. Olson, supra note 18 at 230–33.
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scholars have invoked Treasury’s authority to promulgate retroactive
tax regulations as an important tool for protecting the fisc from
22
“abuse.” Somewhat ironically, prior to Mayo, the American Bar
Association Tax Section’s Task Force on Judicial Deference cited the
IRS’s revenue-raising role as the most important argument in favor of
denying rather than extending Chevron deference to most Treasury
regulations, claiming that “[t]his function of the IRS may encourage
the agency to issue rulings or to promulgate regulations that test the
23
outer limits of reasonableness.”
Anecdotally, defenders of tax exceptionalism often emphasize
the difficulty that Treasury and the IRS face in keeping up with
sophisticated and aggressive tax planners and tax shelter promoters
whose schemes defy the spirit of the tax laws, or in combatting
outright scofflaws who would delay or avoid paying their taxes by
tying up the government in frivolous lawsuits. Certainly such groups
exist, consume scarce administrative resources, and threaten the fisc.
But the government’s reliance on tax collection notwithstanding, it
does not necessarily follow that raising revenue is the only, or even
the primary, focus of the contemporary U.S. tax system and those
24
charged with administering it. The I.R.C. now contains hundreds of

22. Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and “Clear Reflection of Income”:
What Constrains Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 487–88 (1999); see also Marvin
A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Essay, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1956–57 (2005) (advocating retroactive rulemaking as a means of
combatting abusive tax shelters); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and
Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 232–35 (2003) (same).
23. IRVING SALEM, ELLEN P. APRILL & LINDA GALLER, ABA SECTION OF TAXATION:
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL DEFERENCE, in 57 TAX LAW. 717, 724–25 (2004).
24. In discussing the U.S. tax system, I am contemplating the I.R.C.—Title 26 of the U.S.
Code—as administered by Treasury and the IRS. One could argue instead that tax-system
administration concerns revenue assessment and collection efforts across agencies. Many other
federal government agencies are responsible for administering taxes, tariffs, levies, fees,
penalties, and other payments that contribute to the fisc. For example, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is
responsible for administering duties and fines on imported goods. See generally J.F. Chester &
Sophilia Hsu, Going Global: A Legal Primer for Innovation- and Knowledge-Based Companies,
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Summer 2012, at 3 (describing the CBP’s role in administering
import laws); International Fashion Trends: The Business of International Fashion Law, 21
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 795, 820 (2013) (comparing the CBP to the IRS). Also, for a
particularly interesting article criticizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s administration of
a user fee levied by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, see Charles E. Smith, Air
Transportation Taxation: The Case for Reform, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 915, 927–35 (2010).
Nevertheless, I think most evaluations of the U.S. tax system and U.S. tax administration as
such concern the I.R.C., Treasury, and the IRS. Also, the instances of tax exceptionalism from
administrative-law norms that I discuss in this Article concern the I.R.C., Treasury, and the IRS.
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tax expenditure items representing more than $1 trillion of indirect
government spending each year. Former Joint Committee on
Taxation Chief of Staff Edward Kleinbard has called tax expenditures
“the dominant instruments for implementing new discretionary
25
spending policies.” As further observed by former Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Pamela Olson,
The continual enactment of targeted tax provisions leaves the IRS
with responsibility for the administration of policies aimed at the
environment, conservation, green energy, manufacturing,
innovation, education, saving, retirement, health care, child care,
welfare, corporate governance, export promotion, charitable giving,
governance of tax exempt organizations, and economic
26
development, to name a few.

Following a similar theme, several former IRS Commissioners
recently advised the D.C. Circuit that “Congress has decided to
administer an increasingly wide variety of government assistance
programs through the federal income tax system, including assistance
27
for low income families, health care, education, and homebuyers.”
Congress may perceive the non-revenue-raising aspects of the
I.R.C. to be minor and peripheral to the I.R.C.’s core revenue-raising
function; so, for that matter, may defenders of tax exceptionalism who
focus their gaze on those taxpayers who resort to aggressive measures
to avoid paying taxes. But what if that perception is no longer
accurate? As the former IRS Commissioners observed, “Congress’s
willingness to use its taxing power to effectuate public policies in
areas such as health care has fundamentally changed the roles of the
28
tax return and tax return preparers.” If the efforts of tax
administrators are likewise increasingly focused on programs,
purposes, and functions other than raising revenue, then what ought
to be the implications for instances of tax exceptionalism in
administration that are premised on the revenue-raising function?

25. Edward D. Kleinbard, Professor of Law, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: The Congress
Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes
(May 7, 2009), in 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
26. Pamela F. Olson, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: And Then Cnut Told
Reagan . . . Lessons from the Tax Reform Act of 1986, (May 6, 2010), in 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
1, 12–13 (2011) (citations omitted).
27. Brief Amici Curiae of Former Commissioners of Internal Revenue in Support of
Defendants-Appellants at 22, Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2013), 2013 WL
1386248, at *22.
28. Id. at 4.
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Drawing from a much larger and ongoing empirical study of tax
administration and Treasury regulations, this Article offers a
preliminary snapshot of the extent to which the efforts of
contemporary tax administrators focus on programs, purposes, and
29
functions other than raising revenue. The Article focuses on
Treasury regulations—proposed, temporary, and final—promulgated
by Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy with the help of members of the
IRS Chief Counsel’s Office between January 1, 2008, and December
31, 2012. To provide context for the empirical analysis, Part I of this
Article offers a qualitative discussion of the different goals, purposes,
and functions of the contemporary U.S. tax system. Turning to the
empirical study, Part II outlines study methodology and reports the
results. Specifically, the study classified major Treasury regulation
documents by subject matter and evaluated them both document by
document and project by project, outright and based on relative page
length. Across measures, between 30 percent and 40 percent of
observations fell into subject matter categories that are most clearly
oriented toward programs, purposes, and functions other than
traditional revenue raising. Another 25 percent of observations fell
into subject matter categories that arguably serve dual functions. In
short, a lot—maybe even a majority—of the effort that Treasury and
the IRS spend promulgating Treasury regulations concerns programs,
purposes, and functions other than raising revenue. In light of the
study’s findings, Part III of the Article suggests that Congress ought
to reconsider, or at least adjust, some of the statutory exceptions from
administrative-law requirements that it has adopted in the tax
context. Alternatively, or in addition, where the scope of some of
those exceptions is in doubt, courts ought to consider construing the
relevant statutory language in a manner that minimizes its deviation
from general administrative-law norms.
I. THE TAX SYSTEM’S COMPETING FUNCTIONS
Raising revenue is obviously a key function of any tax system. As
30
the saying goes, “Taxes are what we pay for civilized society . . . .”
Taxes provide the funds needed for the government to do all of the
things that we, as citizens, ask it to do to make our society more
29. Distinguishing revenue raising from other programs, purposes, and functions is not
always obvious, easy, or even possible. See infra Parts I and II.B.
30. Compañía Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87,
100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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civilized: building roads and supporting schools; shielding consumers
from adulterated food and mislabeled pharmaceuticals; enforcing safe
workplaces and protecting the environment; and providing a basic
social safety net. The guiding purpose of the U.S. tax system
historically has been, and to some extent still is, to raise revenue. The
culture, practices, and procedures of the IRS, in particular, are
31
oriented toward the mission of raising revenue. Nina Olson has
described the IRS as “the federal government’s accounts receivable
32
department.” As Figure 1 demonstrates, the tax administration
efforts of Treasury and the IRS yield a lot of revenue for the
government—mostly, though not exclusively, from the individual
income tax and employment taxes.

31. E.g., John F. Coverdale, Legislating in the Dark: How Congress Regulates Tax-Exempt
Organizations in Ignorance, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 809, 837–38 (2010) (“The IRS is essentially a
tax collection agency, and its culture reflects that reality.”); Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax
InJustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1173, 1195–96 (2013) (describing the mismatch between the IRS’s
collection-oriented culture, practices, and procedures, and the needs of low-income taxpayers
claiming the earned income tax credit (EITC)); Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less:
Justifying and Reforming Tax Law’s Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071,
1119 (2012) (suggesting that the IRS’s “fundamental collection mission” and “enforcement
culture” get in the way of its administering the Offer In Compromise program).
32. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1 2012 ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 40 (2012), available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/FullReport/Volume-1.pdf.
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Figure 1. IRS Revenue Collections by Type of Tax, Fiscal Year 2012
(Money amounts in thousands of dollars)

Type of Tax
Individual and estate and trust income taxes[a]
Employment taxes: Old-Age, Survivors,
Disability, and Hospital Insurance (OASDHI),
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA),
Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA),
unemployment insurance, railroad retirement
Business income taxes[b]
Excise taxes
Estate and gift taxes
Total

Gross
Collections
1,387,836,515

% of
Total
55.0

784,396,853

31.1

281,461,580
56,174,937
14,450,249
2,524,320,134

11.1
2.2
0.6
100.0

[a]

Includes $37.3 million in Presidential Election Campaign Fund contributions.
Includes $496 million from the unrelated business income tax imposed on tax-exempt
organizations, which is less than .05 percent of total collections.

[b]

The I.R.C. is not and probably could never be entirely value
neutral. For example, Congress seems doomed to choose between
disfavoring single individuals or married couples in determining the
34
income tax rate brackets and the standard deduction. Further, many
longstanding features of the I.R.C. deliberately pursue social welfare
or regulatory goals in the course of raising revenue. The progressive
structure of the individual income tax is frequently justified at least
35
partly as a remedy for societal inequality. Although the estate tax
was adopted largely to raise revenue, combatting inequality was a
36
driver there also, and contemporary defenders of the estate tax

33. The information in Figure 1 derives from the IRS Data Book for the fiscal year ended
September 30, 2012. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2012, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
12databk.pdf.
34. Tax experts have been debating this issue for decades. See generally, e.g., Lily Kahng,
One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
651 (2010); Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1 (2000).
35. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM IN FISCAL POLICY 15–19 (1938); Meredith R. Conway, Money, It’s a Crime. Share It
Fairly, but Don’t Take a Slice of My Pie!: The Legislative Case for the Progressive Income Tax,
39 J. LEGIS. 119, 130–32 (2013).
36. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift Taxation, 9 FLA.
TAX REV. 875, 882 (2010).
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continue to invoke that concern as a rationale for its retention.
Historical evidence suggests that Congress enacted the corporate
income tax not only to raise revenue but also to provide a mechanism
by which the government could regulate corporate activity and
38
constrain corporate political power.
Indeed, taxes are routinely recognized as a tool in the regulatory
39
toolbox. The federal income tax is littered with provisions that are
not based on anyone’s conception of an ideal tax base, but rather are
motivated by a desire to encourage some behaviors and discourage
others. For example, the I.R.C. authorizes income tax deductions for
40
charitable contributions and denies income tax deductions for
41
42
43
bribes, political lobbying, and excessive compensation. Excise
44
taxes are another example, and the I.R.C. contain dozens. Although
they are now actually collected by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

37. See generally, e.g., Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the
Estate Tax To Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013)
(invoking societal inequality as a rationale for retaining the estate tax).
38. STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 43–44 (2010) (acknowledging that regulatory
goals were present but considering them secondary); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations,
Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Income Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1217–20
(2004) (citing historical evidence in justifying the continuation of the corporate income tax on
regulatory grounds). See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990) (documenting regulatory goals
driving the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 as a precursor to the modern corporate income tax).
39. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 277–78 (1987)
(recognizing taxation as a tool for controlling risk); Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory
Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 581
(1979) (discussing tax as a regulatory tool).
40. I.R.C. § 170 (2012). This deduction has been part of the individual income tax since
1921. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 241.
41. I.R.C. § 162(c). Deductions for “improper” payments to foreign officials or employees
were disallowed in 1958. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 5, 72 Stat.
1606, 1608. In 1969, Congress expanded I.R.C. § 162(c) and adopted language that more closely
resembles the current provision. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. § 91-172, § 902(b), 83
Stat. 487, 710.
42. I.R.C. § 162 (e).
43. Id. § 162(m). The deduction limitations for political lobbying and excessive
compensation were both adopted in 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, §§ 13211(a), 13222(a), 107 Stat. 312, 469–71, 477–79 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 162(e), (m) (2012)).
44. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., PUBLICATION 510
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p510.pdf (describing a few dozen excise taxes
in the I.R.C.).
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46

and Firearms, “sin taxes” on liquor and cigarettes have been part of
the I.R.C. for several decades—whether to discourage their use, to
offset the cost of their negative social consequences, or both. The
I.R.C. taxes crude oil and petroleum products, ozone-depleting
47
chemicals, and gas-guzzling vehicles to protect the environment, and
vaccines to fund the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
and compensate the families of children adversely affected by
48
vaccination, among other excise tax examples.
Even some longstanding deductions that we now regard as
serving primarily non-revenue-raising goals at one time may have
been considered relatively value neutral or definitionally essential in
computing net income. In writing about tax incentives, Professor
Stanley Surrey described several tax provisions that “are now
49
defended on incentive grounds” as having “cloudy” origins. The
deduction for home mortgage interest is illustrative. Individual
taxpayers have been able to deduct home mortgage interest since
50
Congress first enacted the income tax in 1913. Today, tax experts
consider the deduction for home mortgage interest to be a tax
51
expenditure item aimed at promoting homeownership. Yet, the
52
Revenue Act of 1913 did not mention home mortgage interest
45. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5001 (imposing taxes on distilled spirits and wines produced in or
imported into the United States). These taxes have existed since at least 1958. Excise Tax
Changes Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-859, § 201, 72 Stat. 1275, 1313–14 (1958) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 5001–5693 (2012)).
46. See I.R.C. § 5701 (imposing taxes on cigars, cigarettes, and other tobacco products
manufactured in or imported into the United States). These taxes have existed since at least
1954. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 52, § 5701, 68A Stat. 1, 705 (1954) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 5701 (2012)).
47. I.R.C. §§ 4064, 4611–4612, 4681–4682. See generally Janet E. Milne, Environmental
Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417 (2011)
(discussing existing environmental taxes as a tool for protecting the environment).
48. I.R.C. §§ 4131–4132; see Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 62 (1999)
(describing the relationship between the vaccine excise tax and the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program).
49. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 127 (1973).
50. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167; CHRISTOPHER HOWARD,
THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 49 (1997).
51. See S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 358 (Comm. Print. 2012) (Cong.
Research Serv.) [hereinafter 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM] (“For taxpayers who can itemize, the
home mortgage interest deduction encourages home ownership by reducing the cost of owning
compared with renting.”).
52. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
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specifically, but merely authorized a deduction for interest payments
53
of any kind. Congress permitted taxpayers to deduct consumer
interest as well as business interest for administrability reasons, which
made sense in a more agrarian era in which business and personal
expenses were often commingled, nonfarm consumer debt was low,
and most homeowners were not subject to the income tax in any
54
event. Congress only began contemplating the deductibility of home
mortgage interest as an incentive for home ownership after World
War II, when homeownership, mortgage debt, and the reach of the
55
income tax had all expanded. In 1986 and 1987, Congress revamped
the interest deduction—denying a deduction for consumer interest
generally, but authorizing a specific deduction for most home
56
mortgage interest to promote homeownership. In short, a deduction
that was once relatively value neutral is now perceived as merely an
indirect financial subsidy to mostly middle-class homeowners and the
real estate industry.
Although the tax system has always served multiple goals, recent
decades have seen a dramatic escalation in tax programs and
provisions serving purposes other than traditional revenue raising.
First and foremost, Congress has dramatically expanded its use of tax
expenditures—various exclusions, deductions, credits, deferrals, and
preferences that, by definition, represent the exact opposite of
57
revenue raising. Not long after Stanley Surrey coined the tax
53. See id. § II(B), 38 Stat. at 167; see also HOWARD, supra note 50, at 53–54 (“Included in
these expenses was interest paid on all indebtedness, including but not limited to home
mortgages.”); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the
Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 240–44 (2010) (discussing
the history of home mortgage interest deductions in the early internal revenue laws).
54. See HOWARD, supra note 50, at 53–54; Ventry, supra note 53, at 241–42.
55. See Ventry, supra note 53, at 252–59 (recounting 1950s criticism of the deduction for
home mortgage interest as well as Congress’s continued support for using the tax code to
promote home ownership).
56. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2246–48 (1986) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(1)–(3) (2012)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330–85 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(1)–(3)); see also
Ventry, supra note 53, at 274–76 (discussing how qualified residence interest was designed to
boost homeownership).
57. See 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51, at 1031–35 (documenting types of tax
expenditures). A daunting array of articles addresses the topic of tax expenditures, including but
not limited to debate over the precise definition of the concept. For one helpful summary of the
scholarly discussion of tax expenditures, including disagreement over the definition, see Eric T.
Laity, The Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures and Institutional Design, 28
VA. TAX REV. 411, 421–29 (2008). For an explanation of the methodology used by the Joint
Committee on Taxation for compiling its list of federal tax expenditures and noting areas of
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expenditures term in the 1960s, the federal tax expenditure budget
listed sixty items totaling somewhere between $60 billion and $65
59
billion. By comparison, the most recent biennial compendium of tax
expenditures prepared by the Congressional Research Service lists
60
two hundred and fifty such items totaling well over $1 trillion, and
61
even that extensive list does not purport to be comprehensive. Some
tax expenditures are small and, sometimes, short-lived, like recent
62
credits for first-time homebuyers and purchasers of electric vehicles.
Others are large, longstanding, and complicated—like the exclusions
for employer contributions for employee health coverage and
retirement plans, or the aforementioned deduction for home
63
mortgage interest.
What may be underappreciated, however, is the extent to which
tax expenditures require the IRS to serve programs, purposes, and
functions that look less like traditional revenue collection and more
like the regulatory and social welfare programs of other, nontax
64
agencies. Congress increasingly utilizes refundable tax credits rather
than direct subsidies to alleviate poverty and support working

disagreement, see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011–2015, 3–10 (Comm. Print 2012).
58. See SURREY, supra note 49, at vii (describing Surrey’s introduction of the term in a
1967 speech and his development of the tax expenditure budget in 1968 as Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy in the Treasury Department).
59. Id. at 7–11.
60. 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51, at 1, 11.
61. The Compendium draws its data from tax expenditure estimates compiled by the Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT). Id. at 1. The JCT, in turn, acknowledges that it does not include
de minimis items that fall below $50 million or items for which quantification is unavailable.
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 57, at 27–30.
62. The tax expenditure estimates compiled by the JCT in 2012 documented more than
thirty items valued at less than $50 million each. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
supra note 57, at 27–28. The same report included seventy-six tax expenditure items that expired
in 2010 and 2011, including, for example, the I.R.C. § 36 first-time homebuyer credit of
(available for homes purchased between April 9, 2008, and May 1, 2010) and the I.R.C. § 30
credit for purchasing a plug-in electric vehicle (available for vehicles purchased between
February 18, 2009, and December 31, 2011). See id. at 28.
63. According to the 2012 Congressional Research Service compendium, the amounts in
2011 for these three expenditures, respectively, were $109.3 billion, $105.3 billion, and $77.6
billion. 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51, at 5.
64. See Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation
of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 67 (2013) (“For the past twenty-five years,
Congress has been relying increasingly on the tax code to accomplish goals beyond raising
revenue.”).
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65

families. Amounts expended by the government on the earned
income tax credit (EITC) and the child tax credit each surpassed
those for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and its
66
predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, years ago. In
other words, the IRS is now one of the government’s principal
welfare agencies, on par with the Department of Health and Human
67
Services (HHS) and the Social Security Administration. Other
scholars have documented some of the administrative challenges
posed by this arrangement, as the tax system’s traditional revenueraising orientation clashes with the objectives of the refundable
68
credits.
Anecdotally, Treasury and IRS officials bemoan the amount of
time they spend implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable
69
Care Act (ACA). Enacted in 2010, the ACA is a complicated and
massive piece of legislation that endeavors to expand health
insurance coverage and control health care costs through various
mandates, regulations, and subsidies administered by a combination
70
of federal and state agencies. The ACA contains several revenueraising components, including new excise taxes on indoor tanning
71
72
73
services and medical devices, a new insurance policy “fee,” and an
65. See Lipman, supra note 31, at 1180–84 (describing the history of the EITC as a
mechanism for alleviating poverty); EITC & Other Refundable Credits, IRS, http://www.eitc.irs.
gov (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (highlighting and facilitating claims to the EITC and other
refundable tax credits). See generally David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of
Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 956 (2004) (discussing Congress’s integration of
spending programs into the I.R.C., comparing the EITC and food stamp programs); Lawrence
Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1867 (2005) (comparing and contrasting the EITC, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, and food stamps).
66. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS: VOLUME TWO: RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 78 (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/09_tas_arc_vol_2.pdf.
67. Lipman, supra note 31, at 1173.
68. See generally Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those
Who Know Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT.
TAX REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2338161; Lipman supra note 31, at 1184–98. But see Zelenak, supra note 65, at 1915 (arguing
that the tax system is better at administering welfare programs than other agencies).
69. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
70. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (noting the
ACA’s goals and size).
71. I.R.C. § 5000B (2012).
72. Id. § 4191.
73. Id. § 4375.
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expanded Medicare tax. The ACA’s infamous individual mandate
may also yield some revenue, but the I.R.C. and ACA label the
mandate a “shared responsibility payment” and a “penalty” rather
75
than a tax. Regardless, the core aims of the ACA are health care
access and cost controls, not raising revenue, and the roles that
Treasury and IRS officials play in ACA implementation extend far
76
beyond the legislation’s revenue-raising components. Since the
ACA’s enactment, Treasury and the IRS have worked with HHS and
the Department of Labor (Labor) to draft regulations that, among
other things, accommodate religious organizations that object to
77
mandatory contraceptive coverage; elaborate the extent to which
group health plans are precluded from denying coverage to
78
individuals with preexisting health conditions; and identify ways in
which health insurance providers may or may not offer incentives for
79
participating in wellness programs. The ACA’s medical loss ratio
provisions, its requirement that health insurers accept all eligible
applicants irrespective of preexisting conditions, and its standards for
coverage and pricing—all of which Treasury and the IRS are involved
in implementing—essentially convert health insurance companies into
public utilities, much like providers of telecommunications services
(regulated by the Federal Communications Commission) or
electricity transmission services (regulated by the Federal Energy
80
Regulatory Commission). In short, in the context of implementing
74. Id. § 1401(b).
75. Id. § 5000A; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84, 2600 (holding that
the individual mandate is not a tax for purposes of I.R.C. § 7421(a), even though the mandate is
constitutional as an exercise of Congress’s power to lay and collect taxes).
76. For a list of ACA tax provisions and discussion of Treasury and IRS responsibilities
with respect to the ACA, see Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions, IRS,
www.irs.gov/uac/Affordable-Care-Act-Tax-Provisions (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
77. Group Health Plans and Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (T.D.
9578) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
78. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition Exclusions,
Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, T.D. 9491, 2010-32 I.R.B. 186,
188–89.
79. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs
in Group Health Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,620 (Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. pt. 54,
29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 146, 147).
80. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 668–
71 (2013) (making this comparison); Richard A. Epstein & Paula M. Stannard, Constitutional
Ratemaking and the Affordable Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability, 38 AM. J.L. & MED.
243, 261–67 (2012) (comparing and contrasting the constitutional posture of health insurers
under the ACA with that of public utilities); Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The
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the ACA, at least, Treasury and the IRS seem indistinguishable from
other, more traditional regulatory agencies.
Although the ACA has expanded and brought renewed
attention to Treasury and IRS involvement in the health care sector,
those agencies’ participation in administering health and welfare
programs is not new. Long before Congress enacted the ACA, it
assigned Treasury and the IRS a leading role in administering health
care as well as pension benefits governed by the Employee
81
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Congress
enacted ERISA to protect participants in certain employee pension
and welfare plans, including health coverage plans, by imposing
various participation, vesting, funding, reporting, and disclosure
82
requirements on the employers and unions that sponsor them. The
role of Treasury and the IRS in administering the pension aspects of
ERISA largely corresponds to provisions in the I.R.C. that exclude
qualifying pension contributions and earnings from taxable
83
84
income —acknowledged tax expenditure items. By contrast,
Treasury and IRS responsibilities for administering ERISA health
coverage requirements (as opposed to ACA health coverage
requirements) relate most closely to a financial penalty, styled as an
excise tax, imposed by the I.R.C. on nonconforming group health

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. HEALTH
& BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 25 (2011) (describing the ACA as adopting “a public utility approach”).
81. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
82. See STEVEN J. SACHER, JAMES I. SINGER & TERESA M. CONNERTON, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW 22–35 (2d ed. 2000) (describing ERISA’s purposes and coverage); Anne Tucker,
Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
153, 163–66 (2013) (same). Although historical accounts of ERISA focus primarily on pension
reform, Congress drafted ERISA to cover a broader array of employee welfare plans, including
employer-sponsored health insurance plans. See SACHER ET AL., supra, at 28 (including
insurance coverage among list of welfare plans covered by ERISA).
83. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 401–407, 410–418E, 457 (2012). Many of these provisions have parallel
provisions in ERISA, and Treasury claims interpretive jurisdiction over both. See COLLEEN E.
MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 95–96 (3d ed. 2011) (listing I.R.C.
provisions and corollary ERISA provisions); see also Mortality Tables for Determining Present
Value, T.D. 9419, 2008-40 I.R.B. 790, 791 n.1 (asserting jurisdiction to adopt morality tables for
determining present value and making other computations for purposes of applying pension
funding requirements under I.R.C. §§ 412 and 430 as well as ERISA § 302); Diversification
Requirements for Certain Defined Contribution Plans, T.D. 9484, 2010-24 I.R.B. 748, 748–49
(adopting regulations concerning diversification requirements for defined contribution plans
holding publicly traded employer securities under both I.R.C. § 401(a)(35) and parallel
provision 29 U.S.C. § 204(j)).
84. 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 57, at 963.
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Regardless, as with the ACA, Treasury and IRS
plans.
administrative efforts in the ERISA area have virtually nothing to do
with raising revenue. Instead, Treasury and the IRS have worked in
recent years, again with HHS and Labor, to adopt regulations
concerning the length of hospital stays for new mothers and their
86
newborn infants and ensuring that the mental health and substance
abuse disorder benefits provided by group health plans enjoy parity
87
with those plans’ medical and surgical benefits.
The exempt organization sector represents yet another area in
which Treasury and IRS regulation has expanded far beyond the
revenue-raising function. Charities have been exempt from the
88
corporate income tax from its origin in 1913, and Congress
authorized the deduction for individual contributions to eligible
89
charities not long after that. Exempt organizations with certain types
90
of income now pay an unrelated business income tax. Neither the
exemption from the corporate income tax, nor the deduction for
charitable contributions, however, contributes to revenue raising in
any way; rather, both are means by which the federal government
91
indirectly subsidizes exempt organizations. In the century since
85. Specifically, for any group health plan that fails to meet the requirements of I.R.C.
chapter 100, I.R.C. § 4980D imposes an excise tax upon a sponsoring employer of one hundred
dollars per day, per individual affected. I.R.C. § 4980D. Chapter 100, in turn, imposes an array
of portability, access, and renewability requirements, as well as benefit requirements for
mothers and newborns and for mental health, among other things. I.R.C. §§ 9801–9802, 9811–
9812 (imposing group health plan requirements); see also MEDILL, supra note 83, at 354–55
(discussing the “excise tax penalty” adopted to enforce group health plan requirements).
86. Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Under the
Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act, T.D. 9427, 2008-47 I.R.B. 1179, 1181.
87. Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, T.D. 9479, 2010-18 I.R.B. 618, 622–26.
88. The Revenue Act of 1913, which established the modern income tax, exempted
charities from the levy imposed on corporate earnings. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16,
§ II.G(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (exempting, inter alia, “any corporation or association organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes”).
89. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 241.
90. I.R.C. §§ 511–514 (2012); FRANCIS R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 21.01 (2002) (describing the unrelated business income tax). For
documentation of the IRS collection of $496 million in unrelated business income tax in fiscal
year 2012, see Figure 1.
91. See e.g., 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 57, at 5 (identifying charitable
contribution deduction as a tax expenditure item); Daniel Halpern, Is Income Tax Exemption
for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283, 311–12 (2011) (concluding that both exempt status
and the charitable contribution deduction are subsidies for exempt organizations). But see Boris
I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Corporations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304 (1976) (concluding that early legislative perceptions
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Congress first exempted charitable organizations from the corporate
income tax, the nonprofit sector has expanded dramatically in both
92
size and complexity. Current Treasury and IRS administration
efforts in this one area now involve an entire IRS division (out of only
93
four) monitoring more than 1.6 million tax exempt organizations
across a few dozen separate statutory classifications that encompass
universities with billion-dollar endowments and tiny religious schools
teaching a few dozen students in a small town; large hospitals and
small, free health clinics; labor unions; chambers of commerce; the
National Football League; churches, big and small; the Metropolitan
Opera and tiny, rural theater companies; the local Elks Lodge; and
94
your Aunt Sadie’s garden club. Defining which organizations are
eligible for exempt status and, separately, which may receive tax
95
deductible contributions is complicated. Evaluating applications for
exempt status and monitoring existing organizations for continued
compliance with eligibility requirements are even more difficult. Tax
administrators in this sector routinely make decisions implicating
96
issues as varied as free speech, politics, and religion; election law and

“that nonprofit organizations are not suitable targets for an income tax . . . was a sound
judgment deserving more attention and respect than it has received from tax scholars”).
92. HILL & MANCINO, supra note 90, ¶ 1.01; James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector:
Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 303, 303–04 (2006).
93. See At-a-Glance: IRS Divisions and Principal Offices, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/At-aGlance:-IRS-Divisions-and-Principal-Offices (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (listing four primary
IRS divisions: Wage and Investment; Large Business and International; Small Business/SelfEmployed; and Tax-Exempt and Government Entities); Tax Exempt & Government Entities
Division at a Glance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Exempt-&-Government-EntitiesDivision-At-a-Glance (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (describing the work of the TE/GE division
and noting “this sector is not designed to generate revenue, but rather to ensure that the entities
fulfill the policy goals that their tax exemption was designed to achieve”).
94. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(1)–(29), (d)–(f) (describing different exempt organization types); see
also Charles A. Borek, Decoupling Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 201–07 (2004) (describing a spectrum of exempt organizations);
Fishman, supra note 92, at 303–05 (same).
95. Only some exempt organizations can receive tax deductible contributions. Compare
I.R.C. § 501 (listing types of exempt organizations), with id. § 170(c) (listing organizations
eligible to receive deductible contributions).
96. See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, Does the Constitutional Norm of Separation of
Church and State Justify the Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches that Engage in Partisan
Political Speech?, 84 IND. L.J. 447 (2009); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics,
and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and
Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious
Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001).
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and, again, health policy and hospital
campaign finance;
98
governance. For a prime example of the difficulties Treasury and the
IRS face in assessing an organization’s exempt status, one need look
no further than recent regulations, proposed in the wake of the IRS–
Tea Party scandal, attempting to identify for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations exactly which activities are candidate-related
99
political activities.
Speaking of politics and campaigns, how many tax experts realize
that the I.R.C. has an entire subtitle dedicated to the financing of
presidential election campaigns? Tax experts who prepare their own
or others’ individual income tax returns will no doubt recall the box
on the Form 1040 asking taxpayers whether they want three dollars
from some unidentified source to fund presidential election
100
campaigns. I.R.C. § 6096 authorizes individual taxpayers to allocate
three dollars of federal funds to the Presidential Election Campaign
101
Fund. Subchapter H, in turn, governs eligibility to receive the funds,
authorizes audits of campaign expenses, requires reports to Congress,
102
and penalizes noncompliance. The Federal Election Commission
103
(FEC) is primarily responsible for administering Subchapter H, but

97. Demonstrating the issues that the IRS faces in this area, in 2011, the Election Law
Journal published an entire volume on this topic. For just a few of the contributions to that
volume, see, for example, Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying:
Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407 (2011); Donald B.
Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory
Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427 (2011).
98. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Putting the Community Back into the “Community Benefit”
Standard, 44 GA. L. REV. 375, 377 (2010) (discussing IRS-developed “community benefit”
criteria that nonprofit hospitals must satisfy to maintain exempt status).
99. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare
Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). For comprehensive coverage of the IRS–Tea Party scandal
through April 5, 2014, including but not limited to reaction to the proposed regulations, see Paul
Caron, The IRS Scandal, Day 331, TAXPROF BLOG (Apr. 5, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.
com/taxprof_blog/2014/04/the-irs-scandal-5.html.
100. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FORM 1040 (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf (offering opportunity to authorize contributions in the
upper right-hand corner of the first page).
101. I.R.C. § 6096; see also Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-809, § 302(a), 80 Stat. 1587–90 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6096 (2012)) (establishing the
fund).
102. I.R.C. §§ 9001–9042.
103. See id. § 9009(b) (authorizing the FEC to promulgate regulations “as it deems
necessary to carry out the functions and duties imposed on it by” chapter 95, consisting of
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Treasury and the IRS play secondary roles that require coordination
and cooperation with the FEC and, occasionally, regulations to
104
govern those administrative efforts. Again, however, Subchapter H
serves no revenue-raising function whatsoever.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY
None of these observations about the contemporary U.S. tax
system’s scope are especially novel. All are well recognized within the
tax policy literature. Nevertheless, my own informal impression is
that many tax experts view the administrative burdens of these
additional programs, purposes, and functions as small and tangential
relative to the revenue-raising function. Although this may be true
provision by provision or program by program, when considered
collectively, these non-revenue-raising items add up. My goal with
this project is to obtain at least a preliminary sense of the extent to
which contemporary tax administration is dedicated to social welfare
and regulatory programs, purposes, and functions, rather than more
traditional revenue raising. To achieve this goal, the Article evaluates
Treasury regulations—proposed, temporary, and final—promulgated
during the five-year period between January 1, 2008, and December
31, 2012.
A. Why Study Treasury Regulations?
If the goal is to evaluate the full picture of tax administration,
studying Treasury regulations alone may seem like a rather limited
place to start. Several government agencies and offices are
responsible for administering different aspects of the U.S. tax system.
Although the Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy and the IRS Chief
Counsel’s Office work closely in promulgating regulations, they
represent separate agencies that perform different administrative
105
functions. Treasury’s regulatory preferences and priorities may not
§§ 9001–9013); id. § 9039(b) (authorizing the FEC to adopt regulations “which it determines to
be necessary to carry out its responsibilities under” chapter 96, consisting of §§ 9031–9042).
104. Treas. Reg. § 702.9006-1 (2008); Treas. Reg. § 702.9037-1 (2008); Treas. Reg.
§ 702.9037-2 (2008).
105. The Internal Revenue Manual discusses this relationship. IRM 32.1.1.3, 32.1.1.3.1,
32.1.1.4.4, 32.1.1.4.5 (Sept. 23, 2011) (discussing involvement of Office of Chief Counsel and
Office of Tax Policy personnel in regulation projects); see LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN
W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES § 1.03 (3d ed. 2008) (comparing Treasury and IRS
involvement in regulation drafting); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ¶
1.02 (1991) (describing the Treasury and IRS roles in the tax system).

HICKMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2014 9:13 AM

2014] ADMINISTERING THE TAX SYSTEM WE HAVE

1737

always align precisely with those of the IRS or the Department of
Justice Tax Division, which also plays a prominent role in tax
106
enforcement. Moreover, the Chief Counsel’s Office is only one part
of a much larger IRS bureaucracy with many offices and divisions
pursuing a wide range of processing, enforcement, educational, and
107
other administrative tasks.
Nevertheless, studying Treasury regulations is a worthwhile first
step. Among the various documents published by Treasury and the
IRS in administering the tax system, Treasury regulations are the
108
most authoritative. Treasury often undertakes regulation projects in
109
response to recent legislation. Congress has tended in recent years
to ask the tax system to do more rather than less, and that trend
110
shows no sign of abating. Therefore, although this study does not
aim to be predictive in any way, determining the extent to which
Treasury regulation projects over the past five years arguably pursued
ends other than raising revenue may give us some idea of what we
might expect from future Treasury and IRS regulatory agendas.

106. GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAUGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX
CONTROVERSIES ¶ 1.09 (describing different functions of IRS and Department of Justice
attorneys in tax cases).
107. SALTZMAN, supra note 105, ¶ 1.02.
108. See, e.g., Mitchell Rogovin & Donald Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations,
Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, TAXES, Aug. 2009,
at 21, 22 (describing Treasury regulations as “the primary source for guidance as to the IRS’s
position regarding the interpretation of the [I.R.C.],” and discussing their legal weight).
109. This proposition should be self-evident. For example, as discussed in Part I above and
documented in Part II.C below, a substantial percentage of Treasury regulation projects
undertaken and documents published in the past five years have concerned the ACA—a
massive piece of legislation that nevertheless required extensive implementing regulations.
Moreover, although the summary of study findings below does not address this topic in detail, as
part of the larger study from which this paper derives, I have coded each regulation project
studied for whether Treasury adopted new regulations or amended old regulations in response
to legislation. Of the 262 regulation projects discussed as part of this paper, 118 contained some
reference to legislation that Treasury was acting to implement. For additional examples
supporting the proposition that Treasury promulgates regulations in response to legislation, see,
for example, T.D. 9533, 2011-33 I.R.B. 139, 139 (acting to implement new requirements imposed
by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act); T.D. 9464, 2009-48
I.R.B. 692, 692 (adopting temporary regulations in response to statutory changes made by the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008); T.D. 9422, 2008-42 I.R.B. 898, 899
(implementing changes made to rules governing S corporations by the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004 and the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005).
110. See supra Part I; see also, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Former Commissioners of Internal
Revenue in Support of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 27, at 3–7 (describing the expansion
of congressional use of the tax system for functions other than traditional revenue raising).
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Also, some of the express and supposed statutory exceptions
from administrative-law norms in the tax context focus importantly
on Treasury regulations more than other tax agency actions. As
already noted, one example is Congress’s explicit authorization in
I.R.C. § 7805(b) of retroactive Treasury regulations with no limitation
for subject matter. Another is the Anti-Injunction Act, which at least
arguably precludes pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury
111
regulations under the APA. In litigation, the government has
argued in recent years that I.R.C. § 7805(e) authorizes the issuance of
temporary Treasury regulations with only postpromulgation notice
and comment and without a contemporaneous claim of good cause—
an approach to notice-and-comment rulemaking that is inconsistent
112
with general administrative-law requirements.
Finally, although IRS administrative activities do not fully align
with Treasury’s regulatory agenda, a certain symbiotic relationship
does exist between Treasury regulations and IRS guidance and
enforcement activity. An IRS that helps draft and must enforce new
Treasury regulations in individual cases is likely to expend its own
resources in interpreting and applying those regulations. Relatedly,
IRS enforcement actions in turn prompt Treasury to promulgate new
regulations as the need for clarification arises. Thus, while Congress
should not rely solely on a study of Treasury regulations in
contemplating the need for IRS organizational reform, the close
relationship between Treasury Department and IRS activities makes
Treasury’s regulatory emphasis at least relevant to such discussions.

111. The scope of the Anti-Injunction Act as a limitation on judicial review in the tax
context has been the subject of recent litigation. E.g., Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc); Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623, 2014 WL 129023 at *8–11 (D.D.C.
Jan. 15, 2014); Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 13-529 (JEB), 2014 WL
114519, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2014). See generally Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy:
Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking
Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008) (discussing this issue).
112. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. To date, the only judicial opinion to address
the issue—a concurring opinion by Judges Halpern and Holmes of the U.S. Tax Court—
squarely rejected the government’s interpretation of I.R.C. § 7805(e) as inconsistent with the
plain text of that provision and as contrary to congressional intent regarding the APA. See
Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 245–46 (2010) (Halpern &
Holmes, JJ., concurring in the result), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012); see also Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66
VAND. L. REV. 465, 496–99 (2013) (discussing this issue at greater length).
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B. Methodology
Like most agencies, Treasury and the IRS promulgate
113
regulations using notice-and-comment rulemaking. For virtually all
Treasury regulation projects, Treasury and the IRS will publish a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR) with background,
114
explanation, and proposed regulatory text.
After affording
interested members of the public an opportunity to submit comments
regarding the proposed regulations, Treasury and the IRS will publish
a Treasury Decision (TD) containing final regulations along with
115
further background and explanation. In many instances, Treasury
and the IRS publish a TD with legally binding temporary regulations
simultaneously with the NOPR and then replace or withdraw the
temporary regulations with the TD that contains the final
116
regulations. This Article evaluates Treasury regulation activity by
considering major rulemaking documents—mostly, but not
exclusively, TDs and NOPRs—published between January 1, 2008,
117
and December 31, 2012.

113. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (2012) (describing notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures generally); IRM 32.1.2.3(3) (Sept. 23, 2011) (describing the process of referencing
the APA and asserting that “the IRS usually publishes its [Notices of Proposed Rulemaking] in
the Federal Register and solicits public comments”).
114. IRM 32.1.1.2.2 (Sept. 23, 2011) (describing IRS NOPRs). Occasionally, Treasury
publishes a TD containing final regulations without first publishing a NOPR. See, e.g., T.D.
9586, 2012-22 I.R.B. 960, 960 (withdrawing existing final regulations without first publishing a
NOPR after Congress repealed the associated I.R.C. provision).
115. IRM 32.1.1.4, 32.1.1.5 (Sept. 23, 2011) (describing TDs and the process of issuing final
regulations).
116. Id. 32.1.1.3 (Sept. 23, 2011) (describing IRS use of temporary regulations). Whether
Treasury and IRS use of temporary regulations complies with the APA’s notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements is an open and debated question. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 112,
at 492–502 (detailing the controversy).
117. For many regulations, Treasury and the IRS also publish one or more minor
documents—for example, to schedule or cancel public hearings, or to correct typographical
errors in TDs or NOPRs. See, e.g., Fees on Health Insurance Policies and Self-Insured Plans for
the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund; Hearing Cancellation, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,573 (Aug. 9, 2012) (canceling a previously scheduled public hearing); Health Insurance
Premium Tax Credit; Correction, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,048 (July 12, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 1) (documenting corrections to regulatory preamble contained in T.D. 9590). These
documents tend to be brief and routinized, but they generally are not published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin and can be easy to miss in the Federal Register. Sometimes Treasury will
publish two separate documents with individual correcting amendments in the same edition of
the Federal Register. On other occasions, Treasury will combine several correcting amendments
in the same Federal Register document. Some minor notices address more than one project. In
sum, including these minor technical documents in the study would have been more distortive
than meaningful.
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1. Identifying the Documents. Treasury and the IRS typically
publish TDs and NOPRs in both the Federal Register and the
Internal Revenue Bulletin. Consequently, major rulemaking
documents were identified in three ways. First, I looked at the
documents listed in the “Highlights of This Issue” and “Finding List
of Current Actions on Previously Published Items” sections of each
issue of the Internal Revenue Bulletin during the relevant time
period. Second, because TDs are numbered sequentially, I
ascertained which were published in the Federal Register during the
relevant time period. Finally, to be certain that I had identified all of
the relevant documents, I searched in Westlaw’s Federal Register
database for the Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) and Counsel
Automated Systems Environment Management Information System
(CASE-MIS) number assigned to each of those documents already
118
located.
During the five years under study, Treasury and the IRS
published 449 major rulemaking documents in the Federal Register
119
120
or the Internal Revenue Bulletin: 241 TDs, 199 NOPRs, and 8
additional, highly substantive documents labeled as an advanced
121
122
123
NOPR, a request for information, or a solicitation of comments.
118. For further discussion of RIN and CASE-MIS numbers, see Appendix 1.
119. Although Treasury and the IRS typically publish all TDs in both the Federal Register
and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin typically occurs
some weeks after publication in the Federal Register. Consequently, the study includes several
TDs published in the Federal Register but not the Internal Revenue Bulletin during the study
period, and vice versa. The study also includes one TD that was published in the Federal
Register but was never published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. For further details, see
Appendix 2.
120. Although Treasury and the IRS typically publish all NOPRs in both the Federal
Register and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin
typically occurs some weeks after publication in the Federal Register. Consequently, the study
includes several NOPRs published in the Federal Register but not the Internal Revenue
Bulletin during the study period, and vice versa. The study also includes one NOPR that was
published in the Federal Register but was never published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. For
further details, see Appendix 2.
121. Treasury and the IRS do not often publish advanced NOPRs. Typically, the IRS uses
revenue procedures or notices published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin but not in the Federal
Register to notify taxpayers that it is contemplating a regulation project and to seek public
comment regarding preliminary thinking about conceptual aspects. Nevertheless, in the time
period covered by the study, Treasury published three advanced NOPRs in the Federal Register
that were sufficiently substantive to warrant inclusion in the study. One described preliminary
proposals for regulating the marketing by tax return preparers of tax refund anticipation loans
and other similar products. See generally Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance
Regarding Marketing of Refund Application Loans (RALs) and Certain Other Products in
Connection with the Preparation of a Tax Return, 73 Fed. Reg. 1131 (Jan. 7, 2008) (to be
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Having identified these 449 documents, I then categorized them by
subject matter and recorded other data for each as follows.
2. Subject Matter Categories. Although it is easy to recognize that
the tax code serves multiple goals, it is impossible to code
meaningfully the full panoply of I.R.C. provisions and Treasury
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301). Another requested comments in response to six questions
concerning potential modifications to the new markets credit program of I.R.C. § 45D and was
published contemporaneously with a NOPR containing proposed regulations implementing that
same provision. See generally Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, New Markets Tax
Credit Non-Real Estate Investments, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,882 (June 7, 2011) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1). The third advanced NOPR posed questions and offered preliminary proposals and
alternatives to address religious objections to contraceptive coverage under the ACA. See
generally Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29
C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
122. Treasury published four requests for information in the five-year time period covered
by the study. See Medical Loss Ratios; Request for Comments Regarding Section 2718 of the
Public Health Service Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,297 (Apr. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt.
54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146, 148); Request for Information Regarding Lifetime
Income Options for Participants and Beneficiaries in Retirement Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 5253 (Feb.
2, 2010); Request for Information Regarding the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 19,155 (Apr. 28, 2009); Request
for Information Regarding Sections 101 Through 104 of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,208 (Oct. 10, 2008). Each of these documents
announced Treasury’s intention to embark upon a regulation project, described the issues to be
addressed by the project, and posed various questions with respect to which Treasury was
seeking public comment. For example, one request for information contained a list of thirtynine questions aimed at helping Treasury and Labor to evaluate “what steps, if any, they could
or should take, by regulation or otherwise, to enhance the retirement security of participants in
employer-sponsored retirement plans and IRAs by facilitating access to, and use of, lifetime
income or other arrangements designed to provide a stream of lifetime income after
retirement.” Request for Information Regarding Lifetime Income Options for Participants and
Beneficiaries in Retirement Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 5253, 5255 (Feb. 2, 2010). Building upon the
answers to these questions, Treasury subsequently issued proposed regulations governing
longevity annuity contracts purchased under tax-qualified defined contribution plans. Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing, Longevity Annuity Contracts, 77 Fed.
Reg. 5443 (proposed Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
123. On August 22, 2011, Treasury, HHS, and Labor together published proposed standards
for benefit and coverage summaries and glossaries provided by health insurance providers to
their customers pursuant to the ACA. Summary of Benefits and Coverage and the Uniform
Glossary, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,442 (proposed Aug. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 54, 602,
29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). On the same day, these same agencies published a
separate document containing and seeking comments regarding proposed templates for a
summary of benefits and coverage and a uniform glossary that would comply with the proposed
regulations. See Summary of Benefits and Coverage and Uniform Glossary-Templates,
Instructions, and Related Materials Under the Public Health Service Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,475
(proposed Aug. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R.
pt.147). Although not labeled a TD or NOPR, this accompanying document, which exceeded
fifty pages in length, seemed sufficiently substantive to be included in this study.
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regulations as serving an exclusively revenue raising, social welfare,
or regulatory purpose. As outlined in Part I, individual tax code
provisions and programs, together with their related regulations,
often reflect two or even all three of these emphases at once.
Nevertheless, categories of tax provisions are readily identifiable as
being more or less heavily oriented toward non-revenue-raising
functions. As discussed in Part I, tax expenditures are obvious. One
might quibble over whether a particular tax expenditure item serves
social welfare purposes or regulatory purposes (or both
simultaneously), but tax expenditures cannot be said to raise revenue
for the government. Regulations implementing the ACA and ERISA,
governing the exempt organization sector, or administering the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund are likewise heavily weighted,
if not completely oriented, toward purposes and functions other than
revenue raising. By contrast, given that Social Security and Medicare
taxes represent the second largest source of government revenue and
remain substantially free of tax expenditures, regulations concerning
these taxes are perhaps the most heavily weighted toward the
revenue-raising function. Given the mixed justifications for the
corporate income tax, the estate tax, and various non-ACA excise
taxes, regulations concerning these taxes arguably fall somewhere in
the middle.
Accordingly, I coded each document according to a list of subject
matter categories that offer at least some sense of the extent to which
Treasury’s regulatory efforts are focused on purposes other than
revenue raising. The categories are as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Tax expenditures
Affordable Care Act
ERISA
Exempt organizations
Corporate/international that is primarily corporate
Individual/not obviously corporate
Gifts, trusts, and estates
Partnerships and other non-T&E pass through
Employment taxes
Non-ACA excise taxes
Campaign finance
Administration and procedure
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Most or all of these categories should be familiar and unobjectionable
to tax experts. For the most part, the listed categories are drawn
directly from large and specifically identifiable programs
administered by the IRS; from I.R.C. subtitles, chapters, and
subchapters; and from government documents reporting taxes
124
The campaign finance category
collected and returns filed.
corresponds to Subtitle H provisions concerning the financing of
125
presidential election campaigns. Nevertheless, a few additional
points of explanation regarding the subject matter categories may be
helpful in assessing the study’s findings.
First, to add objectivity given differences of opinion among tax
experts concerning the definition of tax expenditures, the study relied
on the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 biennial compendia prepared by the
Congressional Research Service in assigning documents to the tax
126
expenditures category. In other words, if a document implemented
a tax provision discussed by one of the biennial compendia, then the
document was coded as belonging to the tax expenditure category.
Even if some might argue that a particular tax provision does not
really represent a tax expenditure, so long as one of the biennial
compendia discussed the provision, then a document interpreting that
provision was coded as belonging to the tax expenditures category.
Correspondingly, even if some might consider a particular tax
provision to represent a tax expenditure item, if none of the biennial
compendia discussed the provision, then a document implementing
the provision was not coded as belonging to the tax expenditure
category.
That said, some provisions in the I.R.C. that were not cited by
one of the biennial compendia nevertheless exist solely to elaborate
the parameters of tax expenditure items. For example, the various
compendia list I.R.C. §§ 401–407, 410–418E, and 457, but not I.R.C.
§ 430, as providing an exclusion from an individual’s income for

124. E.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 33, at 3 tbl.1.
125. I.R.C. §§ 9001–9042 (2012). For further discussion of Subchapter H, see supra notes
102–04 and accompanying text.
126. 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51; S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 111TH CONG.,
TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL
PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 2010) (Cong. Research Serv.); S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 110TH
CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL
PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 2008) (Cong. Research Serv.); S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 109TH
CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL
PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 2006) (Cong. Research Serv.).
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certain employer contributions to employee pension plans. I.R.C. §
430 imposes funding requirements for some qualifying plans and
defines a term contained in I.R.C. § 412—one of the listed
provisions—which also imposes funding requirements for qualifying
128
plans. In short, for some taxpayers, the exclusion will only be
available if their employers comply with I.R.C. § 430. Accordingly,
documents promulgating regulations that interpret I.R.C. § 430 were
coded as belonging to the tax expenditures category, even though
I.R.C. § 430 itself was not listed in any of the biennial compendia.
Second, I assigned each document to a single subject matter
category. Yet, perhaps inevitably, the categories sometimes overlap in
ways that cause a degree of subjectivity in coding certain documents.
For example, Treasury’s administrative responsibilities under ERISA
overlap considerably with the tax expenditure excluding employer
contributions to employee pension plans from an employee’s income.
Indeed, many TDs and NOPRs interpreting the I.R.C. provisions
relevant to that tax expenditure also mention ERISA. In some
instances, Treasury and the IRS note explicitly that relevant
provisions in the I.R.C. and ERISA are parallel and that Treasury has
interpretative jurisdiction over both. I coded such documents based
on my assessment of their dominant concern.
Also, some ACA provisions modify ERISA, so several of the
documents written to implement the ACA mention ERISA as well.
Also, the ACA imposes excise taxes—for example, on medical
devices and indoor tanning services. Still other ACA provisions raise
129
revenue but under some other label like “fee” or “penalty.”
Whatever the label, the ACA’s revenue-raising provisions are often
inextricably intertwined with other aspects of the legislation.
Accordingly, rather than try to code ACA-related documents as
separate subcategories, I gave the ACA its own category and coded
all documents that claimed to implement provisions of the ACA as
such.
Lastly, most documents that fall in the administration and
procedure category implicate tax professionals or taxpayers across
several categories. Occasionally, however, Treasury and the IRS

127. E.g., 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51, at 963.
128. See I.R.C. § 430 (defining the term “minimum required contribution” including for
purposes of I.R.C. § 412(a)(2)(A)).
129. For discussion of the ACA revenue-raising provisions, see supra notes 71–75 and
accompanying text.
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promulgate a procedural regulation that is limited to a particular
substantive I.R.C. section. In such cases, although the regulation
addresses procedural matters, it would not exist but for the
substantive provision. I coded documents fitting this description as
belonging to the relevant substantive category, rather than to the
more general administration and procedure category.
3. Additional Variables Coded. While I considered each of the
449 documents coded to be sufficiently substantive for inclusion,
those documents were not equal in length or complexity. Several
were more than fifty pages long, while many others were limited to a
single page. A one-page TD or NOPR must satisfy all of the same
procedural, circulation, and review requirements as a fifty-page TD
130
or NOPR. In that sense, all of the documents were equal,
irrespective of their page length. Also, page length is not a precise
proxy for complexity or the amount of time Treasury and IRS
personnel spent drafting a document. Nevertheless, to provide a more
thorough basis for evaluating the 449 major rulemaking documents
studied, and to avoid overweighting short documents and
underweighting long ones, I recorded the page length of each in
addition to recording its subject matter.
Also, in addition to considering the 449 major rulemaking
documents individually, I evaluated them on a project-by-project
basis by grouping together those documents that are part of the same
131
rulemaking project.
Individual documents are likely better
indicators of time dedicated to task than entire projects for two
reasons. First, preparing each document takes time, and Treasury and
IRS personnel must satisfy many procedural, circulation, and review
requirements document by document. Second, although most
regulation projects consist of one TD and one NOPR, some
regulation projects contain three, four, or even five such documents.
Evaluating individual documents avoids overweighting smaller
projects and underweighting larger ones. Nevertheless, many
procedural steps are performed project by project rather than
document by document, and the substantive and rhetorical overlap of
documents within a single regulation project undoubtedly offers some

130. Section 32, Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Manual offers detailed requirements for
drafting, circulating, and reviewing regulation documents. IRM 32.1.2.1–32.1.9.5 (Sept. 23,
2011).
131. For more detail on this aspect of the methodology, see Appendix 1.
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132

efficiency of production. Consequently, assessing the documents
project by project as well as individually offers a more thorough
approach to measuring how Treasury and IRS personnel spend their
time.
Altogether, the 449 major rulemaking documents published by
Treasury during the five years covered by the study represent 262
individual regulation projects. Of those projects, 65 contain
regulations that are or were only proposed. Some of the proposed
regulations remained outstanding at the end of the study period,
while others had been withdrawn in lieu of further action. Another 32
projects include temporary and proposed regulations that remained
outstanding at the end of the study period. The remaining 165
projects were finalized during the study period.
Just as I recorded the length of each of the 449 major rulemaking
documents studied, I also added together the page lengths of all of
the documents that were part of a single project. Because some
Treasury regulation projects with documents published during the
study period were initiated prior to that period, however, grouping
the documents studied into projects involved pulling additional
documents that predated the study period. Consequently, although
the findings presented below include the subject matter breakdown of
large Treasury regulation projects based on their total pages, the page
totals for those projects do not correlate precisely with the tables
evaluating individual documents.
C. Results
The following figures present the study results in different ways.
First, the figures report the results of the document, project, and page
counts for each subject matter category individually. Thus, for
example, one can compare the tax expenditures and ACA categories
with the administration and procedure category using each of those
measures.
Second, the figures group the categories into subsets based on
the analysis in Part I. One subset consists of the five categories with
the weakest relationship to the tax system’s traditional revenueraising function: tax expenditures, ACA, ERISA, exempt
organizations, and campaign finance. As also discussed in Part I,
however, other subject matter categories beyond those five possess

132. IRM 32.1.2.1–32.1.9.5.
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histories and features that arguably support thinking about them in
social welfare or regulatory terms. These categories tie closely to
taxes that raise revenue but are also strongly associated with social
welfare and regulatory objectives: the corporate category, which
corresponds to the corporate income tax; the gifts, trusts, and estates
category, which relates to the estate tax; and the non-ACA excise tax
category. Both of the two subsets of categories are, in turn, subtotaled
to the side of each figure. The third and final subset consists of
categories that, with the possible exception of the administration and
procedure category, enjoy the strongest relationship with the
revenue-raising function.
The administration and procedure category is particularly
difficult to characterize as either more or less concerned with revenue
raising than other subject matter categories. The administration and
procedure category includes procedural regulations governing the
filing of returns and the withholding, assessment, and collection of
taxes, as well as penalties for noncompliance and other matters
directly associated with revenue raising. The administration and
procedure category also includes regulations governing the
professional behavior of tax practitioners, implementing the IRS
133
whistleblower program, and safeguarding taxpayer privacy. None of
these matters pertains precisely to revenue raising, yet at the same
time, they all do. As a result, characterizing documents and projects
addressing these issues as either more or less oriented toward raising
revenue seems especially debatable. To be conservative, the following
figures group the administration and procedure category among those
with the strongest relationship to the revenue-raising function.
With that windup, as presented in Figure 2, a straight count of
the major rulemaking documents studied shows that a substantial
portion of those documents addresses programs and provisions other
than traditional revenue raising.

133. For a breakdown of the administration and procedure category, see Appendix 3, Figure
A3.3.
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Figure 2. Straight Count of Major Rulemaking Documents
Category
Tax expenditures
Affordable Care Act
Exempt organizations
ERISA
Campaign finance
Corporate/international that is
primarily corporate
Gifts, trusts, and estates
Non-ACA excise taxes
Administration and procedure
Individual/not obviously
corporate
Partnerships and other nonT&E pass through
Employment taxes
Total
[a]

Count
80
41
13
11
3
89

Percent
17.8
9.1
2.9
2.4
.7
19.8

21
6
98
64

4.7
1.3
21.8
14.3

18

4.0

5
449

1.1
99.9[a]

32.9%
58.7%

This column does not total precisely 100 percent due to rounding.

Shifting the analysis from individual documents to regulation
projects yields similar results, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Straight Count of Regulation Projects
Category
Tax expenditures
Affordable Care Act
Exempt organizations
ERISA
Campaign finance
Corporate/international that is
primarily corporate
Gifts, trusts, and estates
Non-ACA excise taxes
Administration and procedure
Individual/not obviously
corporate
Partnerships and other nonT&E pass through
Employment taxes
Total

Count
50
18
9
5
1
50

Percent
19.1
6.9
3.4
1.9
0.4
19.1

12
3
57
40

4.6
1.1
21.8
15.3

14

5.3

3
262

1.1
100.0

31.7%
56.5%

As Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, between one-sixth and one-fifth of
the documents and projects studied concerned obviously non-
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revenue-raising tax expenditure items. Roughly another one-sixth
concerned the relatively regulatory ACA, exempt organization,
ERISA, and campaign finance categories. Taken together, almost
one-third of the documents and projects studied—hardly a negligible
proportion—addressed the programs and provisions least associated
with traditional revenue raising.
Shaded in Figures 2 and 3, the subset of categories that raise at
least some revenue but are also strongly associated with social welfare
and regulatory goals represent another one-fourth of the documents
evaluated by this study. If one accepts the argument that the
corporate income tax, the estate tax, and excise taxes exist as much or
more to serve social welfare and regulatory purposes than to raise
revenue, then the total number of documents and projects least
associated with traditional revenue raising rises to well above half.
Interestingly, the individual category, which consists principally
of individual income tax matters that are not tax expenditures, and
the employment taxes category together represented less than onesixth of the documents and regulation projects studied. When one
considers that the individual income tax an employment taxes
represent more than 85 percent of gross revenue collected by the IRS,
the number of documents and projects associated with those taxes
seems strikingly small.
Lastly, it is notable that the administration and procedure
category was the largest, representing more than one-fifth of the
major rulemaking documents and regulation projects studied. In an
informal conversation, one former Treasury official with whom I
shared these results suggested that the relatively large number of
documents and projects addressing administrative and procedural
matters represents a substantial shift from twenty years ago. In fact,
he was somewhat dismayed that administrative and procedural
matters, rather than substantive interpretation, seem to consume such
a large percentage of Treasury and IRS time and resources. If he is
right in suggesting that this category has expanded over time, then
one is left to wonder the reasons why.
Evaluating the major rulemaking documents studied in terms of
pages published yields results that are similar yet even more
dramatically weighted toward the primarily non-revenue-raising
categories.
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Figure 4. Page Count of Major Rulemaking Documents
Category
Tax expenditures
Affordable Care Act
Exempt organizations
ERISA
Campaign finance
Corporate/international that is
primarily corporate
Gifts, trusts, and estates
Non-ACA excise taxes
Administration and procedure
Individual/not obviously
corporate
Partnerships and other nonT&E pass through
Employment taxes
Total
[a]

Count
575
526
121
138
4
612

Percent
17.2
15.8
3.6
4.1
0.1
18.4

243
11
568
434

7.3
.3
17.0
13.0

71

2.1

31
3,334

40.8%
66.8%

0.9
99.8[a]

This column does not total precisely 100 percent due to rounding.

According to Figure 4, the percentage of pages published in
connection with tax expenditures roughly correlates with the number
of documents and the number of projects. The percentages for pages
published with respect to the relatively regulatory ACA and ERISA
categories, however, went up—substantially so for the ACA category.
Taken together, fully two-fifths of the pages published addressed
programs and provisions that most obviously stand apart from the
traditional revenue-raising function. Adding the three shaded
categories brings that total up as well to two-thirds of the pages
published.
It might have been foreseeable that the largest difference
between the counts for individual documents or projects and pages
published comes from the ACA category. The ACA was enacted in
134
2010, in the very middle of the period studied. Given the size and
complexity of that legislation and the central role played in its
implementation by Treasury and the IRS, it is unsurprising both that
Treasury and the IRS have dedicated a significant part of their
regulatory agenda since then to implementing that legislation and
that many of the resulting NOPRs and TDs are especially lengthy.
Whether Treasury and IRS efforts to administer the ACA will
134. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
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displace revenue raising or other social welfare and regulatory
programs, purposes, and function to such a degree on an ongoing
basis remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding its recent enactment and
complexity, the ACA was not the only category with large projects.
135

Figure 5: Finalized Projects Over 50 Pages
Project subject
Use of actuarial tables in valuing
annuities (§ 7520)
Methods to determine taxable income in
connection with a cost sharing
arrangement (§ 482)
Treatment of services; allocation of
income and deduction from
intangibles; stewardship expense
(§ 482)
Measurement of assets and liabilities for
pension funding purposes (§§ 430,
436)
Summary of benefits and coverage,
glossary for group health plans
(§ 9815)
Unified rule for loss on subsidiary stock
(§§ 358, 362, 1502)
Special rules to reduce § 1446
withholding (§ 1446)
Tax return preparer penalties (§§ 6694,
6695)
Source rules involving U.S. possessions
and other conforming changes
(§ 937(b))
Basis reporting by securities brokers
(§§ 1012, 6045)
Implementation of Form 990 (§§ 6033,
6043)

Category
Gifts, trusts, and estates

Pages
157

Corporate/international
that is primarily
corporate
Corporate/international
that is primarily
corporate

156
137

Tax expenditures

129

Affordable Care Act

128

Corporate/international
that is primarily
corporate
Administration and
procedure
Administration and
procedure
Corporate/international
that is primarily
corporate
Administration and
procedure
Exempt organizations

110
79
73
71
68
56

135. To avoid comparing apples with oranges, all of the projects presented in Figure 5 were
taken from the 165 regulation projects for which Treasury and the IRS have published final
regulations. Nevertheless, three projects that were still ongoing at the end of 2012 were already
larger than some of those listed in Figure 5. Those three projects concerned the following topics:
the deduction and capitalization of expenditures related to tangible property under I.R.C. § 263,
categorized as individual/not obviously corporate; group health plans and health insurance
issuers, implementing the ACA; and health insurance exclusions for preexisting conditions, also
under the ACA.
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Project subject
Religious accommodation for
contraceptive coverage (§ 9815)
Application of separate limitations to
dividends from noncontrolled § 902
corporations (§ 904)
Gain recognition agreements with
respect to certain transfers of stock or
securities by U.S. persons to foreign
corporations (§ 367)

[Vol. 63:1717

Category
Affordable Care Act
Corporate/international
that is primarily
corporate
Corporate/international
that is primarily
corporate

Pages
54
51
51

As Figure 5 demonstrates, of the fifteen completed regulation
projects totaling more than fifty pages, only two concern the ACA.
Fully six of the twelve subject matter categories are represented
among the largest projects, including tax expenditures and exempt
organizations as well as the corporate and administration and
procedure categories. On the other hand, the individual and
employment tax categories were not represented. Overall, the
average page count among the 165 final projects was slightly less than
20 pages; only 46 projects, or less than 30 percent, were longer than
that average. The categorization of those 46 projects resembles the
other findings.
Figure 6: Breakdown of 46 Final Projects Larger than Average
Category
Tax expenditures
Affordable Care Act
Exempt organizations
ERISA
Corporate/international that is
primarily corporate
Gifts, trusts, and estates
Administration and procedure
Individual/not obviously
corporate
Partnerships and other nonT&E pass through
Employment taxes
Total

Total
8
6
2
1
12

Percent
17.4
13.0
4.3
2.2
26.1

2
8
5

4.3
17.4
10.9

1

2.2

1
46

2.2
100.0

36.9%
67.3%

In summary, whether the focus is on documents, projects, or
page counts, it is apparent that Treasury and the IRS commit
substantial resources to adopting regulations that interpret, elaborate,
and implement tax provisions aimed primarily at regulatory and
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social welfare programs, purposes, and functions rather than raising
revenue. Indeed, depending on how one perceives the corporate
income tax, the estate tax, and non-ACA excise taxes, one could
argue that Treasury and the IRS dedicate less of their regulatory
effort to raising revenue than to other programs, purposes, and
functions. At a minimum, Treasury and IRS expend comparatively
little effort promulgating regulations concerning the revenue-raising
aspects of the individual income tax and employment taxes,
notwithstanding that those taxes together represent the vast majority
of collections. Anecdotally, Treasury regulation drafters have been
swamped for the past few years with implementing the massive ACA.
The ACA is landmark legislation and thus may skew the data
artificially away from revenue raising and yield anomalous results for
the period studied. Nevertheless, as the above analysis indicates,
ACA regulations do not dominate the other categories so
dramatically as to leave other social welfare and regulatory efforts
negligible relative to revenue raising.
III. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
The study documented by this Article provides merely a limited
snapshot of Treasury and IRS tax administration efforts. More
extensive study—covering a longer time frame or evaluating other
aspects of IRS administration, for example—will provide a more
comprehensive understanding of the extent to which the attentions of
Treasury and the IRS are focused on pursuing goals and
administering programs with only a tangential relationship to the U.S.
tax system’s traditional revenue-raising mission.
Nevertheless, this study at least offers a fair indication of the
contemporary mix of issues that drafters of Treasury regulations
spend their time addressing. Like the I.R.C. itself, Treasury
regulations carry the force and effect of law. Promulgating Treasury
regulations is one of the most legally consequential actions that
Treasury and the IRS undertake in administering the tax system. As
noted, some instances of tax exceptionalism from general
administrative-law norms and doctrines particularly concern Treasury
regulations. Specifically, statutory provisions arguably limit preenforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations and explicitly
authorize retroactive effective dates for new Treasury regulations.
Although I have addressed pre-enforcement review in prior work and
will save more complete consideration of retroactivity for the future, I
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would like to take the opportunity here to offer a few thoughts
regarding the potential implications of this study in those areas.
A. Pre-enforcement Judicial Review for Treasury Regulations
The Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a), provides generally
that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
136
assessed.” Correspondingly, the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA)
contains a tax exception that prevents courts from providing
137
declaratory relief for controversies “with respect to Federal taxes.”
Courts generally have interpreted these provisions as operating
138
coextensively and as substantially limiting judicial review of tax
139
cases outside of statutorily authorized refund and deficiency actions.
That said, most of the cases interpreting I.R.C. § 7421 and the
DJA concern either tax protesters raising frivolous legal arguments
140
already rejected by the courts or taxpayers asserting technicalities to
141
avoid levies or property seizures for taxes clearly owed. In the

136. Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
138. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 727–31 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(analyzing the issue and holding in favor of coextensive interpretation); Ambort v. United
States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004) (“In practical effect, these two statutes are
coextensive . . . .”); Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he two
statutory texts are, in underlying intent and practical effect, coextensive.” (quoting In re Leckie
Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996) (quotation mark omitted))).
139. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 748–50 (1974) (reading I.R.C.
§ 7421(a) and the DJA as precluding judicial review of an IRS threat to withdraw an
organization’s exempt status on the ground that allowing the suit could have an indirect effect of
reducing the tax burdens of the organization’s contributors); Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (identifying the purpose of I.R.C. § 7421(a) and the DJA as
“permit[ting] the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial
intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for
refund”).
140. See, e.g., Shrock v. United States, No. 95-3927, 1996 WL 414177, at *1 (7th Cir. July 22,
1996) (calling tax protestor’s claims “frivolous” and “repeatedly rejected”); Gassei v. Dep’t of
Justice, No. 91-6400, 1992 WL 149981, at *2 (10th Cir., Nov. 2, 1992) (rejecting taxpayer’s
argument as clearly contrary to controlling circuit precedent); Purk v. United States, Nos. 8937989, 89-3790, 1990 WL 12188, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 1990) (observing that “other courts have
rejected similar claims” to that raised by the taxpayer).
141. See, e.g., Weiler v. United States, No. 94-56465, 1996 WL 169254, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr.
10, 1996) (finding the record “replete with evidence” that IRS assessments were valid); Nuttle v.
IRS, No. 95-2089, 1995 WL 643106, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 1995) (declining to enjoin the
collection of taxes recognized as due by the Tax Court so that the taxpayer could avoid posting
an appeal bond); Knight v. United States, No. 93-35039, 1993 WL 140589, at *2 (9th Cir. May 4,
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1970s, the Supreme Court cited I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA in
declining to consider constitutional challenges to IRS ruling letters
denying or revoking exempt organization status under I.R.C.
142
§ 501(c)(3). In response, Congress adopted a statutory exception for
143
such rulings. The Court also cited I.R.C. § 7421 in declining to
consider the merits of a Vietnam War–era constitutional challenge by
war protesters to income tax withholding in which the taxpayers
conceded that they would likely lose a refund action and that they
merely wanted the opportunity to decline to pay their taxes and to
144
require the government to levy.
By contrast, case law regarding whether I.R.C. § 7421 and the
DJA preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury
regulations is both limited and mixed. The Supreme Court has never
145
addressed the question. In California v. Regan, the Ninth Circuit
decided that regulations requiring third-party reporting of pensionplan data would “have an impact on the assessment of federal taxes”
by enabling the IRS to evaluate individual beneficiaries’ claims to
favorable tax treatment and thus could not be reviewed pre146
enforcement. Similarly, in Foodservice & Lodging Institute v.
147
Regan, the D.C. Circuit concluded that regulations governing how
restaurant employers allocate and report tip income among
employees “plainly concern[ed] the assessment or collection of” those
employees’ federal taxes and were thus unreviewable pre148
enforcement.
Also in Foodservice & Lodging Institute, however, the D.C.
Circuit concluded that I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA did not preclude a
pre-enforcement challenge to a regulation that required restaurants
to report tips received so that the IRS could evaluate tip compliance
in the restaurant industry, reasoning that regulation “[did] not relate
149
to the assessment or collection of taxes.” More recently, in Cohen v.
1993) (refusing to enjoin the collection for lack of deficiency notice because the I.R.C. did not
require notice).
142. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 761–63 (1974); Bob Jones Univ.,
416 U.S. at 736–48.
143. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306(a), (b)(8), 90 Stat. 1520, 1717,
1719–20 (1976) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7428(a) (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)).
144. United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 10–12 (1974) (per curiam).
145. California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1981).
146. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
147. Foodservice & Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
148. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 846. The D.C. Circuit went on to uphold the regulation as reasonable. Id. at 847.
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150

the D.C. Circuit allowed an APA procedural
United States,
challenge against an IRS notice to proceed outside the usual channels
151
of refund and deficiency actions. The Cohen case did not involve a
pre-enforcement challenge, precisely, as the taxes at issue had already
been paid, and the Cohen court was careful to restrict its justiciability
152
determination to the case’s facts and circumstances. Nevertheless,
much of the Cohen court’s reasoning could be extended to allow
other APA procedural challenges to proceed pre-enforcement. Since
the D.C. Circuit decided Cohen, at least one district court has
declined to apply I.R.C. § 7421 to dismiss a pre-enforcement APA
challenge to the validity of a Treasury regulation. In Florida Bankers
153
Ass’n v. United States Department of Treasury, the district court
allowed a pre-enforcement APA challenge against information
reporting regulations implementing the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act to proceed notwithstanding the Anti-Injunction Act,
citing the D.C. Circuit decisions in both Foodservice & Lodging
154
Institute and Cohen. Also in the D.C. Circuit, the government did
155
not even raise the question of reviewability in Loving v. IRS —a preenforcement challenge to the validity of Treasury regulations that
would impose competency testing, continuing education, and ethics
156
requirements on tax return preparers.
157
Nevertheless, in Halbig v. Sebelius, another district court held
that I.R.C. § 7421 precluded judicial review of a pre-enforcement
APA challenge to Treasury regulations concerning health insurance
158
premium tax credits under the ACA. Also citing Cohen, the Halbig
court concluded that because the credits would, in turn, would trigger
certain assessments on employers under I.R.C. § 4980H, and those

150. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
151. Id. at 734 (“Allowing judicial review of Appellants’ APA suit is consistent with the
APA’s underlying purpose . . . .”)
152. Id. at 725–26.
153. Fla. Bankers Ass’n. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 13-529 (JEB), 2014 WL 114519
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2014).
154. Id. at *6–7.
155. Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061, 2014 WL 519224 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 2014).
156. See generally Brief for the Appellants, Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061, 2014 WL 519224
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2013), 2013 WL 1282685 (failing to address reviewability); Defendants’
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv00385-JEB), 2012 WL 8133439 (same).
157. Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623 (PLF), 2014 WL 129023 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014)
158. Id. at *8–11.

HICKMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2014 9:13 AM

2014] ADMINISTERING THE TAX SYSTEM WE HAVE

1757

assessments served a revenue-raising function, the Anti-Injunction
159
Act precluded the employers’ suit.
The relevant statutory text is sufficiently open to interpretation,
and case law in the area is so limited, that courts have some latitude
in deciding whether to interpret I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA to allow
pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations. Focusing on
the importance of the IRS’s revenue-raising function, the Supreme
Court in the 1960s and 1970s embraced a broad construction of what
it means to restrain tax assessment and collection that would seem to
preclude just about any tax case outside of statutory refund or
deficiency actions. By contrast, at least some of the more recent court
opinions have adopted narrow interpretations of “assessment” and
160
“collection” to allow APA challenges to proceed.
The leading Supreme Court case supporting a broad application
161
of I.R.C. § 7421—Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,
decided in 1962—emphasized the IRS’s revenue-raising function:
“The manifest purpose of [I.R.C. § 7421] is to permit the United
States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial
162
intervention . . . .” If courts perceive that an increasing number of
new Treasury regulations are more oriented toward non-revenueraising programs and goals, however, they may be more inclined to
construe pre-enforcement challenges to those regulations as
unrelated to the assessment and collection of taxes, and thus beyond
the scope of I.R.C. § 7421.
Regardless of what the courts do, Congress should revisit the
scope of I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA. Although protecting the fisc is an
important goal, Congress has previously signaled its recognition that
some circumstances warrant extending pre-enforcement judicial
review. As noted above, Congress adopted an exception from I.R.C.
§ 7421 and the DJA in response to Supreme Court decisions
precluding judicial review of IRS rulings denying or revoking exempt

159. Id. at *11.
160. Fla. Bankers Ass’n, 2014 WL 114519, at *6; Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (en banc); see Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 100–02 (2004) (interpreting similar
language in 28 U.S.C. § 1341). But see Halbig, 2014 WL 129023, at *9 (applying I.R.C. § 7421 to
preclude judicial review of pre-enforcement APA challenge to a regulation governing a tax
credit because the plaintiffs’ ultimate goal was to “restrain” the IRS from assessing a related
excise tax).
161. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
162. Id. at 7.
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163

organization status. Congress could again contemplate adopting
language that would further narrow the scope of I.R.C. § 7421 and the
DJA to bring judicial review of Treasury regulations in closer
alignment with administrative-law norms.
B. Retroactivity
For space reasons, this study did not attempt to evaluate
regulations’ effective dates; I instead chose to save a more thorough
examination of that issue for future work. Nevertheless, this study
demonstrates the merits of considering in greater depth the ability of
Treasury and the IRS to adopt retroactive Treasury regulations.
I.R.C. § 7805(b) authorizes Treasury to make final regulations
apply retroactively to the date Treasury published a related proposed
or temporary regulation in the Federal Register, and to make both
final and temporary regulations apply retroactively to the date
Treasury or the IRS issued a public notice substantially describing the
164
regulation’s expected contents. I.R.C. § 7805(b) goes on to offer
several additional circumstances in which Treasury is authorized to
adopt retroactively effective regulations, including when Treasury
adopts a regulation within eighteen months after Congress enacts the
165
related statutory language; when Treasury seeks “to prevent
166
167
abuse”; or when Treasury endeavors to correct procedural defects.
Notwithstanding its breadth, the current language of I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) represents a contraction of Treasury’s authority to adopt
retroactive regulations. Prior to 1996, Treasury regulations were
presumed to apply retroactively to the date that Congress enacted the
related statutory language unless Treasury exercised its discretion to
168
provide otherwise. In 1996, Congress substantially amended I.R.C.
§ 7805 to remove that presumption and to authorize retroactivity only

163. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
164. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (2012). The same provision gives Treasury the third and obvious
option of making final and temporary regulations apply as of the date on which Treasury files
them in the Federal Register, but doing so would not make said regulations retroactive.
165. Id. § 7805(b)(2).
166. Id. § 7805(b)(3).
167. Id. § 7805(b)(4).
168. See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 46.04[3] (2002) (documenting the history of Treasury’s
authority to adopt regulations with retroactive effect).
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under specified circumstances, which as noted nevertheless remain
169
quite broad.
Prior to 1996, courts reviewed Treasury’s decision to apply its
regulations retroactively for abuse of discretion based on the several
factors, such as whether the regulation in question changed the law,
whether the taxpayer had justifiably relied on prior pronouncements,
and whether retroactively applying the regulation would yield overly
170
harsh results. Since 1996, courts have had few opportunities to
consider the scope of Treasury’s authority to adopt retroactively
effective regulations. A few cases discuss what it means for a
regulation to prevent abuse, but they all concern a single regulation—
Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6—which requires a partner to reduce its
basis in a partnership interest when the partnership assumes certain
171
liabilities of the partner. Although one court addressing this issue
concluded both that Congress authorized retroactivity and that the
172
regulation would prevent abuse, another district court and the
Court of Federal Claims have found that retroactive effect was
173
neither authorized nor a proper exercise of preventing abuse. The
continued vitality of pre-1996 factors for assessing abuse of discretion
174
remains undetermined.
169. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101(a), 110 Stat. 1452, 1468 (1996)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7805). The amended statute applies only to regulations relating
to statutory provisions enacted on or after July 30, 1996. Id. § 1101(b).
170. E.g., Gehl Co. v. Comm’r, 795 F.2d 1324, 1332–34 (7th Cir. 1986); Baker v. United
States, 748 F.2d 1465, 1467 (11th Cir. 1984); Wilson v. United States, 588 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th
Cir. 1978); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 981 (5th Cir. 1977); Chock
Full O’Nuts v. United States, 453 F.2d 300, 302 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973); see Dixon v. United States,
381 U.S. 68, 80 (1965) (“Congress has seen fit to allow the Commissioner to correct mistakes of
law, and in § 7805(b) has given him a large measure of discretion in determining when to apply
his corrections retroactively. In the circumstances of this case we cannot say that this discretion
was abused.”); John S. Nolan & Victor Thuronyi, Retroactive Application of Changes in IRS or
Treasury Department Position, 61 TAXES 777, 783 (1983) (“More recently, courts have taken the
approach that any retroactive application of a regulation may be reviewed for abuse of
discretion, although such abuse is rarely found.”).
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 (2005).
172. Maguire Partners-Master Invs., LLC v. United States, No. CV 06-07371-JFW(RZx),
2009 WL 4907033, at *19 & n.4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (“[T]he Treasury Department simply
applied the pre-existing rule contained in Revenue Ruling 88–77 to address the possibility of
abuse . . . .” (emphasis added)).
173. Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (2008), rev’d on other grounds, 613 F.3d
1249 (10th Cir. 2010); Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516 (2009); Stobie
Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008).
174. For an interesting discussion of judicial review of Treasury regulation retroactivity
under the current I.R.C. § 7805(b), see generally Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse
According to Whom?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2013).
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As noted in the Introduction, Treasury’s authority to adopt
retroactive regulations is unusual among administrative agencies. The
administrative-law norm against retroactive rulemaking is rooted in
175
popular notions regarding fair notice and the rule of law.
Retroactive rulemaking may still make sense in the tax context as a
mechanism for combating tax shelters or other abuses. Given the
extent to which Treasury regulates in areas less obviously related to
the tax system’s traditional revenue-raising mission, however, further
study is warranted to assess how Treasury and the IRS exercise their
discretionary authority under I.R.C. § 7805(b). Rather than leaving
Treasury and the IRS with such broad authority to make all of their
regulations retroactive, Congress could and perhaps ought to consider
further curtailing that power. For example, authorizing retroactivity
only to counter abusive transactions could protect the revenue-raising
function while bringing other, less revenue-oriented aspects of the tax
system into closer alignment with general administrative-law norms.
In the meantime, however, greater judicial awareness of the scope of
Treasury and IRS administrative efforts in other, non-revenue-raising
areas may prompt the courts to examine Treasury and IRS decisions
to adopt retroactive regulations with a more critical eye.
C. IRS Reform
Although the study documented in this Article evaluated only
Treasury regulations rather than IRS resource utilization more
broadly, the division of Treasury’s priorities has implications for the
IRS that are worth at least preliminary consideration. In particular,
despite occasional nods to customer service and a spiffy, separate
176
website focused on the EITC and other refundable tax credits, the
IRS’s cultural orientation toward raising revenue and collecting taxes
may risk undermining the effectiveness of programs and provisions
aimed at alleviating poverty and providing financial support to
177
working families. But aspects of that culture, too, may make the IRS
less than ideal choices to serve a wide array of regulatory functions
that have historically fallen to other, more traditional administrative
agencies.

175. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
176. EITC & Other Refundable Credits, supra note 65.
177. For acknowledgement of scholarly debate over this issue, see supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
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As David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have argued, the decision
to utilize the tax system to implement government spending programs
178
is fundamentally a choice about institutional design. To date,
Congress seems not to have thought too deeply about the matter,
instead simply seeing the IRS as an existing and convenient
bureaucracy for administering many seemingly small, as well as some
rather large, nontax programs. As a result, the IRS has transitioned
over time from a mission-driven agency that collects taxes to an
omnibus agency that does many things, without careful consideration
of the administrative consequences of that transition. Is it too much to
ask the IRS to maximize congressional goals of serving low-income
families, providing health care, protecting pensions, monitoring the
nonprofit sector, and encouraging economic growth while
simultaneously serving as the federal government’s accounts
receivable department? At a minimum, applying the old revenuecollection toolbox in pursuing all of these government programs,
purposes, and functions seems likely to achieve suboptimal outcomes.
Although this study alone may not impel a restructuring of the IRS,
and I will leave further thoughts about IRS reform for future work, it
at least seems plausible at this point to suggest that the tax system
may be reaching an organizational tipping point of being stretched
too thin between too many, arguably competing goals—not just in
terms of raw resources, but with respect to institutional capacity.
CONCLUSION
It is important to underscore that this study offers only a
preliminary analysis of the allocation of Treasury and IRS
administration efforts between raising revenue and other programs,
purposes, and functions. In particular, the IRS does much more than
help Treasury draft regulations. Further study is warranted.
Nevertheless, the outcome of this study ought at least to give
some pause to defenders of tax exceptionalism who base their
arguments on the importance of raising revenue and protecting the
fisc from abusive transactions and structures. Courts should approach
such arguments skeptically, and Congress should contemplate more
seriously the potential administrative-law implications of situating
nontax programs in the IRC.
178. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 65, at 957 (“[T]he tax expenditure decision, which
we will also call the integration decision or the decision to combine tax and spending programs,
is solely a matter of institutional design.”)
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APPENDIX 1:
METHODOLOGY—DEFINING A TREASURY REGULATION PROJECT
As noted in Part II of the Article, for most Treasury regulation
projects, Treasury and the IRS will publish at least one NOPR and
one TD. A standard regulation project will contain only one of each,
as Treasury and the IRS first propose a set of regulations and then
finalize them after giving the public an opportunity to comment. For
many other projects, Treasury and the IRS publish a TD with legally
binding, temporary regulations simultaneously with the NOPR, and
then replace or withdraw the temporary regulations with a second TD
179
that contains the final regulations. Sometimes, Treasury and the
IRS will publish more than one TD with temporary regulations and
more than one NOPR before issuing a final TD. On very rare
occasions, Treasury and the IRS publish a TD with final regulations
without also publishing a NOPR or allowing an opportunity for public
comment. Some NOPRs, and even certain TDs with temporary
regulations, are withdrawn without ever being finalized. Some
NOPRs remain open, seemingly in perpetuity. As previously
documented, Treasury occasionally publishes documents with other
titles that nevertheless contribute substantively to a regulation
180
project. In short, a single Treasury regulation project may contain
anywhere from one to several major documents.
The most useful way of identifying which major rulemaking
documents constitute a single project is to compare one or both of the
181
CASE-MIS number and the RIN listed on each document. The
Internal Revenue Manual instructs IRS attorneys to obtain a CASEMIS number when opening a regulation project and to continue using
that project number until Treasury publishes a final regulation or
closes the project without issuing regulations. Most NOPRs include
the project’s CASE-MIS number in their title sections, although most
TDs do not. Most TDs do, however, mention the project’s CASEMIS number when referring to the associated NOPR in the

179. See IRM 32.1.1.3 (Aug. 11, 2004) (describing IRS use of temporary regulations).
180. For discussion of other major rulemaking documents evaluated in the study, see supra
notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
181. See IRM 32.1.2.2 (Aug. 11, 2004) (explaining the purpose of the CASE-MIS); id.
32.1.2.2.5 (Aug. 11, 2004) (instructing drafting attorneys to obtain an RIN for each regulation
project from the Regulatory Information Service Center of the General Services
Administration).
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background section of the preamble text. Separately, the Internal
Revenue Manual instructs IRS attorneys to use the RIN in the
heading of any regulation published in the Federal Register and also
to use that same RIN for both final regulations and their associated
182
NOPRs.
With a very straightforward project that contains a single NOPR
and TD, all of the documents will bear the same RIN. The Internal
Revenue Manual goes on to instruct, however, that if a single NOPR
leads to more than one TD containing final regulations, new RINs
183
should be obtained for the later TDs. Also, when Treasury
publishes a TD with temporary regulations and simultaneously
publishes a NOPR that proposes those same regulations by crossreferencing the TD, the Internal Revenue Manual calls for the TD
184
and the NOPR to have different RINs. Consequently, it is not
uncommon for a Treasury regulation project with one or more sets of
temporary regulations to bear multiple RINs. Often, references to the
CASE-MIS number remain consistent throughout, thereby
facilitating grouping.
Nevertheless, even with the CASE-MIS numbers and RINs,
idiosyncrasies occasionally present additional grouping challenges.
For example, Treasury and the IRS sometimes will pursue
simultaneously more than one project interpreting a particular I.R.C.
section. Even if different Treasury and IRS attorneys work on these
simultaneous projects, one would expect them to confer with one
another. Should two projects that overlap with respect to both timing
and I.R.C. section, but do not cross-reference one another in their
NOPRs and TDs, be treated as a single project? If Treasury formally
identified the documents as comprising two separate projects, for
example by assigning different CASE-MIS numbers, I did as well.
Also, Treasury and the IRS sometimes will publish a TD with
final regulations that explicitly leaves open a particular issue and
then, on the same day or shortly thereafter, will publish another
NOPR, or even a TD with temporary regulations, addressing that
same issue and discussing the first TD as part of its background
section. Again, the two successive projects presumably are staffed by
the same Treasury and IRS attorneys who might reasonably consider
the latter NOPR or TD as simply continuing a larger project that
182. Id. 32.1.2.2.5.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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includes the earlier documents. On other occasions, it may be months
or even years before Treasury and the IRS issue a NOPR or TD with
temporary regulations to address an issue left open by an earlier TD.
The longer the break between the two events, the less likely it seems
that the same team of attorneys were involved. Yet, the later NOPR
or TD may still cross-reference and describe the earlier regulation
project. Should two successive projects that address related issues and
cross-reference one another in this way ever be combined? If so, then
is there some point at which too much time has passed between
projects to consider them so related? Again, I have generally
followed the government’s lead: where Treasury and the IRS formally
classified the documents as separate projects, for example by
assigning different CASE-MIS numbers, so did I. On at least one
occasion, however, Treasury and the IRS finalized one set of
temporary and proposed regulations in the same TD as it adopted a
new, second set of temporary regulations, which it then
simultaneously proposed with a NOPR in the same edition of the
Federal Register. In that case, because Treasury and the IRS
combined the two, arguably separate projects into a single TD, I
treated these efforts as a single project.
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APPENDIX 2:
DETAILS REGARDING TDS AND NOPRS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Although Treasury and the IRS typically publish all TDs in both
the Federal Register and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, publication
in the Internal Revenue Bulletin typically occurs some weeks after
publication in the Federal Register. Consequently, as listed in Figure
A2.1, the study includes seven TDs published in the Federal Register
in 2007, but in the Internal Revenue Bulletin in 2008.
Figure A2.1. TDs Included Despite 2007 Federal Register Publication
Treasury
Decision
T.D. 9374
T.D. 9373
T.D. 9372
T.D. 9371
T.D. 9370
T.D. 9369
T.D. 9368

Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite
2008-10 I.R.B. 521
(Mar. 10, 2008)
2008-8 I.R.B. 463 (Feb. 25, 2008)
2008-8 I.R.B. 462 (Feb. 25, 2008)
2008-8 I.R.B. 447 (Feb. 25, 2008)
2008-7 I.R.B. 419 (Feb. 19, 2008)
2008-6 I.R.B. 394 (Feb. 11, 2008)
2008-6 I.R.B. 382 (Feb. 11, 2008)

Federal Register Cite
72 Fed. Reg. 74,175 (Dec. 31, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 74,192 (Dec. 31, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 73,261 (Dec. 27, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 72,592 (Dec. 21, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 72,606 (Dec. 21, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 72,929 (Dec. 26, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 72,582 (Dec. 21, 2007)

Also, as listed in Figure A2.2, the study includes six TDs published in
the Federal Register in 2012, but in the Internal Revenue Bulletin in
2013.
Figure A2.2. TDs Included Despite 2013 Internal Revenue Bulletin
Publication
Treasury
Decision
T.D. 9608
T.D. 9607
T.D. 9606
T.D. 9605
T.D. 9603
T.D. 9601

Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite
2013-3 I.R.B. 274 (Jan. 14, 2013)
2013-6 I.R.B. 469 (Feb. 4, 2013)
2013-11 I.R.B. 586
(Mar. 11, 2013)
2013-11 I.R.B. 587
(Mar. 11, 2013)
2013-3 I.R.B. 273 (Jan. 14, 2013)
2013-10 I.R.B. 533 (Mar. 4, 2013

Federal Register Cite
77 Fed. Reg. 76,400 (Dec. 28, 2012)
77 Fed. Reg. 76,380 (Dec. 28, 2012)
77 Fed. Reg. 75,844 (Dec. 26, 2012)
77 Fed. Reg. 76,382 (Dec. 28, 2012)
77 Fed. Reg. 72,923 (Dec. 7, 2012)
77 Fed. Reg. 66,915 (Nov. 8, 2012)

Similarly, although Treasury and the IRS typically publish all NOPRs
in both the Federal Register and the Internal Revenue Bulletin,
publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin typically occurs some
weeks after publication in the Federal Register. Consequently, as
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listed in Figure A2.3, the study includes eight NOPRs published in
the Federal Register in 2007, but in the Internal Revenue Bulletin in
2008.
Figure A2.3. NOPRs Included Despite 2007 Federal Register
Publication
CASE-MIS
Number

Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite

REG-111583-07

2008-4 I.R.B. 319 (Jan. 28, 2008)

REG-139236-07

2008-9 I.R.B. 491 (Mar. 3, 2008)

REG-147290-05

2008-10 I.R.B. 576 (Mar. 10, 2008)

REG-104946-07

2008-11 I.R.B. 596 (Mar. 17, 2008)

REG-104713-07

2008-6 I.R.B. 409 (Feb. 11, 2008)

REG-141399-07

2008-8 I.R.B. 470 (Feb. 25, 2008)

REG-114126-07

2008-6 I.R.B. 410 (Feb. 11, 2008)

REG-147832-07

2008-8 I.R.B. 472 (Feb. 25, 2008)

Federal Register Cite
72 Fed. Reg. 74,233
(Dec. 31, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 74,215
(Dec. 31, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 74,213
(Dec. 31, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 73,680
(Dec. 28, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 72,970
(Dec. 26, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 72,646
(Dec. 21, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 72,645
(Dec. 21, 2007)
72 Fed. Reg. 74,246
(Dec. 21, 2007)

Also, as listed in Figure A2.4, the study includes three NOPRs that
were published in the Federal Register in 2012, but in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin in 2013.
Figure A2.4. NOPRs Included Despite 2013 Internal Revenue Bulletin
Publication
CASE-MIS
Number

Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite

REG-155929-06

2013-11 I.R.B. 650 (Mar. 11, 2013)

REG-141066-09

2013-3 I.R.B. 289 (Jan. 14, 2013)

REG-122707-12

2013-5 I.R.B. 450 (Jan. 28, 2013)

Federal Register Cite
77 Fed. Reg. 76,426
(Dec. 28, 2012)
77 Fed. Reg. 74,798
(Dec. 18, 2012)
77 Fed. Reg. 70,620
(Dec. 18, 2012)

Finally, although Treasury publishes most TDs and NOPRs in both
the Federal Register and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, as listed in
Figures A2.5 and A2.6, one TD and one NOPR published in the
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Federal Register seem inadvertently to have missed publication in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin.
Figure A2.5. TD Not Published in Internal Revenue Bulletin
Treasury
Decision

Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite

T.D. 9578

n/a

Federal Register Cite
77 Fed. Reg. 8725
(Feb. 15, 2012)

Figure A2.6. NOPR Not Published in Internal Revenue Bulletin
CASE-MIS
Number

Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite

REG-101826-11

n/a

Federal Register Cite
76 Fed. Reg. 32,822
(June 7, 2011)
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APPENDIX 3:
BREAKDOWNS OF LARGEST CATEGORIES
The following tables supplement Figures 2, 3, and 4 of the Article
by elaborating the makeup of the three largest categories.
Figure A3.1. Breakdown of Tax Expenditures Category
Subcategory subject
Net exclusion of pension
contributions and earnings plans
for employees and self-employed
individuals
Items falling under the general
business credit
Items related to state and local
government bonds, including
exclusion of interest on public
purpose bonds and credit to
holders of qualified zone activity
bonds
Deferral and ratable inclusion of
income arising from business
indebtedness discharged by the
reacquisition of a debt instrument
Deduction for certain qualified film
and television products
Deduction for domestic production
activities
Special tax rate for nuclear
decommissioning funds
Election to expense certain refineries
Amortization of business start up
costs
Income averaging for farmers and
fishermen
Deduction for mortgage interest on
owner-occupied residences
Exclusion for health savings account
contributions
Deduction for small refiners with
capital costs associated with EPA
sulfur regulation compliance
Exclusion of damages on account of
personal physical injury
Deduction for charitable
contributions
Disaster relief provisions
Totals
[a]

Major Rulemaking
Documents:
Jan. 2008 – Dec. 2012
Number of
Document
Documents
Pages

Number of
Regulation
Projects
(All
Studied)

26

307

19

16

73

10

5

29

4

4

29

2

4

12

2

2

21

2

3

38

1

3
3

12
10

1
1

3

8

1

3

5

1

2

9

2

2

6

1

2

3

1

1

11

1

1
80

3
576[a]

1
50

The total for this column differs from the corresponding item in Figure 4 due to rounding.
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Figure A3.2. Breakdown of Corporate/International That Is Primarily
Corporate Category
Subcategory subject
Affiliated and controlled groups
(§§ 267, 382, 1502, 1561, 1563)
Subchapter C corporate/shareholder
transactions and corporate
reorganizations (§§ 301–368,
381)
Transfer pricing (§ 482)
Subchapter I insurance companies
(§§ 801–848)
Source rules relating to foreign
income (§§ 861–863)
Tax on income of foreign
corporations/branch profits tax
(§§ 881–884)
Foreign tax credits (§§ 901–909)
Controlled foreign corporations
(§§ 951–965, 1248)
Information return for taxpayers
filing Form 5472—25% foreign
owned U.S. corporations or
foreign corporations engaged in
U.S. trade or business (§ 6038A)
Classification of foreign business
entities (§ 7701)
Expatriated entities and their
foreign parents (§ 7874)
Total
[a]

Major Rulemaking
Documents:
Jan. 2008 – Dec. 2012
Number of
Document
Pages
Documents

Number of
Regulation
Projects
(All
Studied)

24

161

14

22

131

15

6
2

159
8

3
2

5

8

2

4

16

3

1
14

23
69

1
5

2

3

1

3

3

1

6

30

3

89

611[a]

50

The total for this column differs from the corresponding item in Figure 4 due to rounding.
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Figure A3.3. Breakdown of Administration and Procedure Category
Subcategory subject
Regulation of tax practice (including
Circular 230)
Tax return preparer penalties
Third party information reporting
and withholding:
•
Basis reporting by securities
brokers
•
Other withholding matters
•
Other third party
information reporting
Assessment and collection matters
Filing and reporting matters
Taxpayer penalties
Whistleblower program
Taxpayer privacy
Awards of administrative costs and
attorneys fees
Taxpayer assistance orders
Measuring organizational and
employee performance inside the
IRS
Total
[a]

Major Rulemaking
Documents:
Jan. 2008 – Dec. 2012
Number of Document
Pages
Documents

Number of
Regulation
Projects
(All
Studied)

16

98

9

4

81

2

3

76

2

12
7

67
45

6
4

9
17
9
6
11
1

43
68
27
26
24
8

7
11
4
3
6
1

2
1

6
1

1
1

98

570[a]

57

The total for this column differs from the corresponding item in Figure 4 due to rounding.

